Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition by Moraga González, J.L. & Petrikaite, V.
TI 2012-017/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies 
and the Incentives to Merge under 
Bertrand Competition 
 
 
José L. Moraga-González1,2 
Vaiva Petrikaitė2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 VU University Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 University of Groningen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the
Incentives to Merge under Bertrand Competition∗
Jose´ L. Moraga-Gonza´lez† Vaiva Petrikaite˙‡
Revised: February 2012
Abstract
This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell dif-
ferentiated products and consumers search for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetric
equilibrium, the probability that a firm is the next one to be visited by a consumer is equal across
firms not yet visited. However, in the short-run after a merger, because insiders raise their prices
more than what the outsiders do, consumers start searching for good deals at the non-merging
stores. Only when they do not find any product satisfactory enough, they continue searching at
the merging stores. When search costs are sufficiently large, consumer traffic from the non-merging
firms to the merged ones is so small that mergers become unprofitable. This new merger paradox,
which is more likely the higher the number of non-merging firms, can be overcome in the medium-
to long-run if the merging firms choose to stock their shelves with all the products of the con-
stituent firms, which generates sizable search economies. Such demand-side economies can confer
the merging firms a prominent position in the marketplace, in which case their price may even be
lower than the price of the outsiders. In that case, consumers visit first the merged entity and
the firms outside the merger lose out. Search cost economies may render a merger beneficial for
consumers and so overall welfare may increase.
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1 Introduction
While no one would deny that searching for price and product fit is costly in real-world markets –
think for example about the time we spend test-driving new cars, acquiring new furniture, touching
digital tablets, trying on new clothes and shoes, etc.– there has been little work in the industrial
organization literature about the influence of search costs on the incentives to merge and on the
aggregate implications of mergers. In this paper we offer three novel insights. First, in markets where
search costs are sizable, a merger (of firms selling differentiated products and competing in prices) may
result in losses for the merging parties in the short-run. Second, if the merged entity in the long-run
chooses to stock the shelves of its shops with all the products of the constituent firms, then search
economies unfold and mergers can become profitable and welfare improving. Finally, when search
costs are considerable, the outsider firms lose out in the long-run.
We study mergers in a model that could well be referred to as the workhorse model of consumer
search for differentiated products. This model was introduced by Wolinsky (1986) and was further
studied by Anderson and Renault (1999).1 A finite number of firms compete in prices to sell their
differentiated products. Consumers search for satisfactory deals sequentially and have perfect recall.
In the pre-merger market, all firms look alike and when consumers pick a first shop to visit, they do so
in a random way. Those consumers who fail to find a satisfactory product continue searching and once
again they pick the next shop to be visited randomly; and so on. When search cost is equal to zero,
the model is similar to Perloff and Salop (1985) and the analysis of mergers gives the same results as
in Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
However, the existence of search costs makes the order in which consumers visit firms to depend on
the prices they charge and on the amount of variety they carry. We distinguish between the short-run
and the long-run effects of mergers. In the short-run, firms that merge coordinate their prices and
everything else is kept constant. In the long-run, by contrast, the merged entity, after a more or less
complex process of business reorganization, stocks its products together, shutting down some of the
stores of the parent firms if economical.
Price coordination among the merging firms leads them to charge higher prices than the non-
merging firms’ prices. Given this, optimal search leads consumers to search first at the non-merging
firms and then, in the event they fail to find a satisfactory product in those firms, continue searching at
the merging stores. Therefore, the merging firms, by internalizing the pricing externalities they confer
on one another, confer the non-merging firms a prominent position in the marketplace. This puts the
merging firms at a disadvantage; in equilibrium, as search costs increase, consumer traffic from the
1More recently, this model has been used to explain incentives to invest in quality (Wolinsky, 2005), product-design
differentiation (Bar-Isaac et al., 2011) and the emergence and effects of market prominence (Armstrong et al., 2009;
Armstrong and Zhou, 2011; Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2011; Zhou, 2009).
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non-merging stores to the shops of the merged entity diminishes, which makes merging less profitable.
We show that any 2-firm merger is unprofitable if search costs are sufficiently high. Moreover, we show
that any arbitrary k-firm merger becomes unprofitable if search costs and the number of non-merging
firms are sufficiently high. With these results we establish a new merger paradox. What is interesting
about this paradox is that it arises when firms sell horizontally differentiated products and compete
in prices.
In the long-run, however, the merged entity can counter the detrimental effects of price coordination
by choosing to stock in each of its shops all the products of the constituent firms.2 By stocking a
wider range of products, the merged entity effectively lowers the costs of searching the products
of the potentially merging firms. This generates demand-side economies that may give the merged
entity a prominent position in the marketplace. We show that when the economies of search are
sufficiently strong, in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the post-merger market, the merged entity
gains prominence in the marketplace and attracts all consumer first-visits. If unsatisfied with the deals
available there, consumers continue searching at the non-merging stores.
In contrast to the paradoxical result found in the short-run, we show that in the long-run merging
becomes individually rational provided that search costs are sufficiently high. In addition, and in
contrast to most papers on mergers, we find that the outsiders’ profits decrease after a merger takes
place. These two results together are important since they provide a new theoretical rationale for why
merger waves can be observed in the real-world and also for why the outsiders to a merger sometimes
oppose consolidation processes of rival firms. We finally show that in the long-run consumers may
even benefit from consolidation in the marketplace because the benefits from lower search frictions
along with the possibility that the insiders charge lower prices than the outsiders may jointly result
in a net positive effect.
The literature on the incentives to merge and the aggregate implications of mergers is quite ex-
tensive. For a recent survey of the main theoretical and empirical insights see Whinston (2006). A
seminal paper in the literature is Salant et al. (1983), who demonstrated that merging is not very
attractive in environments where firms compete in quantities and offer similar products. This result
is referred to as the merger paradox. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) showed that price-setting firms
selling horizontally differentiated products, other things equal, always have an incentive to merge. In
contrast to the Cournot case analyzed by Salant et al. (1983), this result arises because price increases
of the merging firms, which favor the coalition partners, are accompanied by price increases of the
2Hewlett Packard and Compaq, whose merger was cleared in 2002, soon started selling each other products in their
separate online shops; in recent days, the merged entity has chosen to downplay the Compaq name in its products.
KLM, which merged Air France in a transaction that was cleared subject to conditions in 2004, sells flights operated by
Air France in its online shop, and viceversa. Daimler-Benz and Chrysler merged in 1998 but their retail sales largely
remained separate; this hindered Chrysler’s market penetration in Europe and added to the difficulties experienced by
the automobile giant short after merging.
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non-merging firms, which also favors them. Our paper puts forward a new merger paradox, which
surprisingly arises under price competition with differentiated products. The underlying reason is
based on the impact of price coordination on optimal consumer search, something quite different from
the merger paradox of Salant et al. (1983), which concerns competition with decision variables that
are strategic substitutes.
Since the seminal paper of Williamson (1968), the role of mergers at generating supply-side
economies (or cost-synergies) that can more than offset the market power effects of consolidation
has been the focus of a considerable amount of research. Perry and Porter (1985), Farrell and
Shapiro (1990) and McAfee and Williams (1992) explicitly modelled the cost efficiencies that arise
from economies of sharing assets in product markets and stated conditions for an efficiency defense of
mergers. Our paper brings out a new efficiency defence argument of mergers, but based on demand-
rather than on supply-side economies. We show that the economies of search that unfold in the long-
run when the merging firms stock wider ranges of products can result in the merging firms becoming
prominent in the marketplace, thereby weakening (and sometimes even more than offsetting) their
incentives to raise prices above the outsider firms and making a merger welfare-improving.
To the best of our knowledge, the US and EU guidelines do not mention demand-side economies
arising from merger activity. By contrast, Section 5.7 of the 2010 Merger Assessment Guidelines of the
UK Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading acknowledges the importance of demand-
side efficiencies in merger control. However, the guidelines focus mainly on cases where consumer buy
multiple items and product complementarities are significant: “Demand-side efficiencies arise if the
attractiveness to customers of the merged firm’s products increases as a result of the merger. Common
examples of demand-side efficiencies include: network effects, pricing effects and ’one-stop shopping’.3
The argument in our paper is clearly different and we hope that it adds to the design of finer merger
guidelines. We show that demand-side efficiencies can also unfold when products are substitutes and
consumers buy a single product. It is savings in search costs that make visiting first the merged entity
a more attractive option than visiting first the outsiders. It is obvious that this mechanism should
continue to hold in markets where there are product complementarities or where consumers buy a
range of products.
Since in the post-merger market consumers visit merging and non-merging firms in an order that
maximizes expected utility, our paper is also related to the recent literature on ordered search. Ar-
batskaya (2007) studies a market for homogeneous products where the order in which firms are visited
3Merger Assessment Guidelines (OFT1254, p.57, 2010). With network effects, users place a higher value for a product
the more it is used by other consumers. A merger may make networks compatible and so enhance the welfare of consumers.
Pricing effects arise when bringing complement products under common ownership, which may results in lower prices
for all products. Gains from one-stop shopping arise when consumers have a strong preference for buying a range of
products at a single supplier.
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is exogenously given. In equilibrium prices must fall as the consumer walks away from the firms
visited first. Zhou (2011) considers the case of differentiated products and finds the opposite result.
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) study the implications of prominence in search markets. In
their model, there is a firm that is always visited first and this firm charges lower prices and derives
greater profits than the rest of the firms, which are visited randomly after consumers have visited the
prominent firm. Zhou (2009) extends the ideas in Armstrong et al. (2009) to the case in which a set of
firms, rather than just one, is prominent. In Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011) firms gain prominence
by investing in advertising; they find that firms need not benefit from higher consumer search costs.
Armstrong and Zhou (2011) present alternative ways in which firms can become prominent. In our
model, the merging stores, by raising their prices to internalize the pricing externalities they exert
on one another, confer the non-merging firms a prominent position in the marketplace. This effect is
detrimental for the merging firms and we show that it leads to a new merger paradox when search
costs are significant. In the long-run, however, the merging firms can choose to stock the wider range
of products of the parent firms so as to effectively lower search costs and become prominent in the
marketplace.
Our paper is also related to a strand of the consumer search literature dealing with firm’s choice of
location, entry and choice of product-lines. Our paper and those papers have in common that consumer
search economies play a central role. In Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983) savings in search costs can
explain the observed geographical concentration of stores selling differentiated products. Fischer and
Harrington (1996) go one step further and investigate the role of product heterogeneity in explaining
interindustry variation in firm agglomeration. Schulz and Stahl (1996) show that economies of scope
in search costs can lead to excessive (price-increasing) entry. Economies of scope in shopping costs
also arise when consumers buy multiple products and prefer to concentrate their purchases within a
single supplier (one-stop shopping). Klemperer (1992) shows that in these situations firms may prefer
head-to-head competition over product-line differentiation. In a subsequent paper, Klemperer and
Padilla (1997) show that search cost economies can lead to excessive product-line variety.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the consumer search model
and the benchmark pre-merger market equilibrium. Section 3 presents the analysis of mergers, for both
cases, merger effects in the short-run and merger effects in the long-run. Section 4 offers a discussion
of the main results. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are placed in the appendix to ease the reading of
the paper.
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2 The model and the pre-merger symmetric equilibrium
We study the model of consumer search for differentiated products first proposed by Wolinsky (1986)
and further studied by Anderson and Renault (1999). On the supply side of the market there are n
firms selling horizontally differentiated products. All firms employ the same constant returns to scale
technology of production and we normalize unit production costs to zero. Firms compete in prices
and they choose them simultaneously. On the demand side of the market, there is a unit mass of
consumers. A consumer m has tastes described by an indirect utility function umi(pi) = εmi − pi, if
she buys product i at price pi. The parameter εmi can be thought of as a match value between consumer
m and product i. We assume that the εmi is the realization of a random variable uniformly distributed
on [0, 1].4 Match values are independently distributed across consumers and products. No firm can
observe εmi so personalised pricing is not possible. Define zk ≡ max{ε1, ε2, ..., εk}. For later reference,
it is useful to calculate the optimal price of a multi-product monopolist selling k varieties, which we
denote by pmk . This price maximizes the expression p(Pr[zk ≥ p]), and is given by pmk = (1 + k)−
1
k .
Setting k = 1 we have the single-product monopolist, whose price is simply denoted by pm and is
equal to 1/2.
Consumers search sequentially with costless recall. Each search costs the consumer s.5 To avoid
that a market equilibrium fails to exist (Diamond, 1971), we assume throughout that s is sufficiently
small so as to make a first search always worthwhile for a consumer. The entire paper revolves around
the case where search costs are sizable. It is such case that delivers new and interesting results. In
fact, when s = 0 the model is similar to Perloff and Salop (1985) and the effects of mergers in that
case are similar to Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
The pre-merger market equilibrium
As a benchmark case, in this Section we characterize the pre-merger market symmetric equilibrium.6
Here we assume that search cost s ∈ [0, 1/8].7
Following Wolinsky (1986), let p∗ denote the price charged by firms other than firm i and consider
4The uniform distribution is adopted for simplicity, specially in the subsequent analysis of mergers. In an earlier
paper Moraga-Gonza´lez and Petrikaite˙ (2011) we showed that alternative distributions give similar results.
5Though we can view this assumption as a standard Nash assumption, rationalizing it requires some sophistication
on the part of consumers. In fact, we shall assume that consumers do know the ownership structure of the firms, their
prices and the number of products sold in each of the establishments.
6We note that asymmetric equilibria can be sustained in this model. The idea is that if consumers believe that firms’
prices follow the order, say, p1 < p2 < ... < pn, then it is optimal for consumers to visit firms in that order and for firms
to price in such a way so as to make consumer beliefs coherent. The unattractive feature of these equilibria is that they
are not determined by the underlying characteristics of the market, but by an indeterminacy of beliefs. We will ignore
this type of equilibria in our paper. A completely different situation is that studied in Armstrong et al. (2009) and Zhou
(2011) where it is assumed that the shops of the firms are arranged in a particular way so consumers have no alternative
than to visit them in a pre-specified exogenous order.
7We need to make sure that the first search is always worth. The worse case is when consumers expect the firms
to charge the monopoly price. Therefore we require that s ≤ Pr[ε ≥ pm]E[ε − pm | ε ≥ pm], which is equivalent to
s ≤ s ≡ (1− pm)2/2. Since pm = 1/2, s ≤ 1/8 suffices.
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the (expected) payoff to a firm i that deviates from the symmetric equilibrium by charging a price
pi 6= p∗. In order to compute firm i’s demand, we need to characterize consumer search behavior.
Kohn and Shavell (1974) characterize the solution of the search problem of a consumer who faces a
sequence of independently and identically distributed population of options with known distribution.
They show that the optimal decision rule is static in nature and has the “reservation value property”.
Accordingly, let x be the solution to∫ 1
x
(ε− x)dε = 1
2
(1− x)2 = s. (1)
The left-hand-side of (1) is the expected benefit from searching one more time if the best option so far
is x. Searching one more time is worthwhile if and only if these incremental benefits exceed the cost of
search s. Therefore, x = 1 −√2s represents the threshold match value above which a consumer will
decide not to continue searching for another product. Since s ∈ [0, 1/8], we have that x ∈ [1/2, 1].
We start by computing the probability that a consumer accepts the offer of firm i, conditional
on the consumer visiting firm i first. Suppose that the purchase option at firm i gives the buyer
utility εi − pi. If εi − pi < 0, the consumer will search again given our assumption s < s. Suppose
εi−pi ≥ 0. The equilibrium requirement that consumer expectations are fulfilled implies that a buyer
who contemplates searching again expects to see a price of p∗ at the next shop to be visited. Therefore,
searching one more time, say at firm j, yields expected gains equal to
∫ 1
εi−pi+p∗ [εj − (εi− pi + p∗)]dεj .
In any equilibrium it must be the case that x ≥ p∗ for otherwise no consumer would participate
in the market. Therefore, the probability that a buyer stops searching at firm i given that firm i is
visited first, is equal to Pr[εi − pi + p∗ > x] = 1− x− pi + p∗.8
Before visiting firm i, the consumer may have visited other firm(s). The probability that a consumer
goes to firm i in her second search after having visited, say, firm j, and decides to acquire the offering
of firm i right away is Pr[εi − pi > x − p∗ > εj − p∗] = x(1 − x − pi + p∗). Similarly, the probability
that a consumer goes to firm i in her `th search and decides to acquire the offering of firm i right away
is x`−1(1− x− pi + p∗).
To complete firm i’s payoff calculation, we need to compute the joint probability that a consumer
walks away from every single firm in the market and happens to return to firm i to conduct a transac-
tion, that is, Pr[max{0, zn−1− p∗} < εi− pi < x− p∗]. This probability is independent of the order in
which firms are visited. We will denote it as ra(·) to indicate that these sales originate from consumers
who return to a firm i after having visited all the firms in the market. We then have:
ra(pi; p
∗) ≡
∫ x+pi−p∗
pi
(εi − pi + p∗)n−1dεi =
∫ x−p∗
0
(εi + p
∗)n−1dεi =
1
n
(xn − p∗n). (2)
8This probability is positive provided that the deviating price is not too high, i.e., pi < 1− x+ p∗ for otherwise every
single consumer would walk away from firm i. In what follows we derive the payoff of a firm under the assumption that
pi < 1 − x + p∗. When this inequality does not hold, the payoff is slightly different. We deal with this case later (see
footnote 9).
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Using the notation introduced above, we can now write firm i’s expected profits:
pii(pi; p
∗) = pi
[
1− xn
n(1− x)(1− x− pi + p
∗) + ra(pi; p∗)
]
. (3)
We look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. After applying symmetry, i.e., pi = p
∗, the
first-order condition (FOC) is:
1− p∗n − p∗ 1− x
n
1− x = 0 (4)
It is easy to check that (4) has a unique solution that satisfies x ≥ p∗ ≥ 1− x.9 In addition, one can
readily show that the equilibrium price increases in the search cost s.
The profits of a typical firm in the pre-merger situation are
pi∗ =
1
n
p∗(1− p∗n). (5)
3 Equilibrium when k firms merge
This section is divided into two parts. In section 3.1 we study the price implications of mergers and
the incentives to merge abstracting from any source of efficiency gains. In this sense, the focus is on
the effects of joint (price) decision-making, exactly as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). In section
3.2, we study the same questions but from a medium- to long-run perspective where we let the merged
entity to stock in each of its shops all the goods of the k parent firms. Anticipating the results, we first
show that in the short-run, and provided that search costs are relatively high, firms do not have an
incentive to merge. This result is interesting because a merger paradox is established in environments
where firms sell differentiated products and compete in prices. In the medium- to long-run when
the merged entity stocks all the products of the constituent firms, however, demand-side economies
unfold. These economies of search, provided they are sufficiently large, make mergers profitable and
welfare improving. This result constitutes a new efficiency defence argument of mergers, but based
on demand- rather than on supply-side economies.
3.1 Short-run effects of mergers
Consider that k firms merge, with 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. We assume here that s ∈ [0, (1− (1 + k)−1/k)2/2].10
9The equilibrium price p∗ is indeed an equilibrium if no firm has an incentive to deviate from it. So far we have checked
that “small” deviations are not profitable. Suppose now that the deviant firm charges a price so high that consumers
always walk away from it and therefore this firm only sells to those consumers who come back to it after having visited all
other firms. In that case the deviant profits become pii(pi; p
∗) = pi
∫ 1
pi
(ε− pi + p∗)n−1dε. Because of log-concavity of the
uniform density function, this profits expression is quasi-concave in own price (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991). Taking the
derivative of the deviating profits with respect to pi , and setting pi = p
∗, we get dpii/dpi|pi=p∗ = (1− p
∗n−np∗)/n < 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that p∗ solves (4). Since deviating profits are quasi-concave and they decrease
at pi = p
∗, we conclude they are even lower at prices pi such that x+ pi − p∗ > 1.
10Again, we need that consumers find it worthwhile to make a first search even if they expect firms to charge the
monopoly price. The monopoly price of a firm controlling k stores is pmk = (1 + k)
−1/k, which increases in k. Therefore
we require s ≤ Pr[ε ≥ pmk ]E[ε− pmk |ε ≥ pmk ].
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As before we focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that all non-merging firms will be assumed
to charge a price denoted by p˜∗, and all merging firms will be supposed to charge a price denoted by
pˆ∗.11 Since a non-merging firm controls the price of a single variety, we let p˜∗ ∈ [0, pm]; the merged
entity, by contrast, controls the price of k varieties and correspondingly we let pˆ∗ ∈ [0, pmk ]. As it is
expected, suppose also that the merging firms charge higher prices than the non-merging firms, i.e.,
p˜∗ < pˆ∗. A priori, this is a reasonable conjecture because the internalization of the pricing externalities
the merging firms confer on one another typically lead these firms to charge higher prices than the
non-merging ones. In Section 4, however, we study whether an alternative symmetric equilibrium
where the merging firms charge a price lower than the non-merging firms, i.e. p˜∗ > pˆ∗, exists.
Given that p˜∗ < pˆ∗, consumers do now face a problem of search where the options have known,
independent but non-identical utility distributions. Weitzman (1979) shows that also in this case the
optimal decision rule is static in nature and has the “reservation value property”. In particular, he
proves that consumers should search as follows: at every step in the search process, a consumer should
consider visiting next the (not-yet-visited) shop for which reservation utility is highest; moreover,
at every step in the search process a consumer should terminate her search whenever the maximum
sampled reward obtained so far is above the reservation utility at the shop to be visited next.
Let x be given by (1). The number x− pˆ∗ defines the reservation utility for searching the product of
a merging firm. Likewise, x− p˜∗ is the reservation utility for searching the product of a non-merging
store. Since p˜∗ < pˆ∗, Weitzman’s results prescribe consumers to start searching for a satisfactory
product at the non-merging firms and then, if no alternative is found to be good enough in those
firms, continue searching at the merging ones. This implies that the post-merger demands of the two
types of stores (merging and non-merging) are similar to the demands derived by Zhou (2009) in his
paper dealing with competition between prominent firms –which are visited first– and non-prominent
ones –which are visited later–.12
To calculate the post-merger equilibrium prices, we proceed by computing the payoff that merging
and non-merging firms would obtain when deviating from the equilibrium prices. While deriving
the payoffs of the two types of (deviating) firms, we require consumer expectations about the prices
charged by firms not yet visited to be correct. In what follows, a typical merging firm will be indexed
by i, while a typical non-merging store will be indexed by j.
11As in the pre-merger market, it may be possible to sustain asymmetric equilibria in the sense that distinct non-
merging and/or distinct merging firms may charge different prices. Again, these asymmetries are not based on any
underlying characteristic of the market and can only be sustained because of the indeterminacy of consumer beliefs
discussed in the previous section (cf. footnote 6). We will abstract from these types of asymmetric equilibria.
12To be sure, the payoff of a non-merging (deviating) firm is exactly identical to the payoff of a prominent (deviating)
firm in Zhou’s (2009) paper. However, since all the prices of the merged firms are under the control of a single manager
in our paper, the payoff of the (deviating) merging firms is different from the payoff of a non-prominent firm in Zhou’s
paper.
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Payoff to a deviant non-merging store.
Consider a non-merging store j that deviates from p˜∗ by charging a price p˜ 6= p˜∗. As all non-merging
firms are expected to charge the same price p˜∗, consumers visit them randomly. Therefore, the deviant
firm may be visited in first place, second place and so on till the (n − k)th place. As any other non-
merging store, the deviant has a probability 1/(n − k) of being visited in each of these positions.
When the consumer visits the deviant in the 1st, 2nd, ..., (n − k − 1)th place, the decision whether
to continue searching or not takes into account that the next shop to be visited is also a non-merging
store. By contrast, when the deviant firm is the last non-merging store visited by the consumer, i.e.
the (n− k)th, the decision of the consumer is slightly different because the next shop to be visited is a
merging store and such a store charges a price different from the price of a non-merging store. Since
the consumer stopping rule at any of the first n − k − 1 non-merging stores is different from that at
the last non-merging store, it is convenient to distinguish among those two cases.
Consider then first the situation in which a consumer visits the deviant non-merging firm j in hth
place, with h = 1, 2, ..., n − k − 1. Suppose the deal a consumer observes upon entering the deviant’s
shop is εj − p˜. There are three circumstances in which the consumer will buy the product of the
deviant.
• First, the consumer may stop searching at this shop and buy there right away. This occurs when
εj ≥ x− p˜∗ + p˜. Therefore, the joint probability a consumer visits the deviant in hth place and
buys there directly is13
Pr[zh−1 − p˜∗ < x− p˜∗ < εj − p˜] = xh−1 (1− x+ p˜∗ − p˜)
• Second, the consumer may walk away from the firm visited in hth place and come back to it
after visiting all non-merging stores.14 This occurs when
Pr[max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, x− pˆ∗} < ε˜j − p˜ < x− p˜∗]
and this gives the following demand from “returning” consumers:
r˜nm(·) ≡
∫ x−p˜∗+p˜
x−pˆ∗+p˜
(εj − p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dεj = 1
n− k
[
xn−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
]
where the subindex “nm” refers to the fact that consumers return to the deviant firm after
having visited all the non-merging stores.
13Here we are again assuming “small” deviations in the sense that p˜ < 1−x+ p˜∗. Like in footnote 9, we need to make
sure that deviating to larger prices is not profitable either. We prove this in the appendix.
14To see this, note that optimal search implies that the consumer would walk away from the last non-merging store
and visit one of the merging firms if zn−k ≤ x¯ − pˆ∗ + p˜∗. Moreover, if the consumer happens to arrive to the (n − k)th
non-merging store, it must be the case that zn−k−1 ≤ x¯. Since pˆ∗ > p˜∗, it is clear that the condition to leave the last
non-merging store and continue searching among the merging stores is more stringent than that to continue searching
among the non-merging stores. For this reason, the consumer may return to the deviant firm after having visited all
non-merging firms and buy there.
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• Finally, the consumer may walk away from the deviant non-merging firm and come back to it
after having visited all the firms in the market. This occurs when
Pr[max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, zk − pˆ∗, 0} < ε˜j − p˜ < x− pˆ∗]
and this gives the following demand from consumers “coming-back” to the deviant:
r˜a(·) ≡
∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(εj + p˜
∗)n−k−1 (εj + pˆ∗)k dεj (6)
where the subindex “a” refers to the fact that consumers return to the deviant firm after having
visited all the stores in the market.
We now consider the case in which the consumer visits the deviant firm in (n− k)th place. There
are two situations in which the consumer will buy the deviant’s product:
• First, the consumer may stop searching at its shop and buy there right away. This occurs with
probability
Pr[εj − p˜ ≥ max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, x− pˆ∗} and zn−k−1 < x]
and this gives a demand
xn−k−1 (1− x+ p˜∗ − p˜) + 1
n− k
[
xn−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
]
• Second, the consumer may walk away from this firm and come back to it after visiting all the
firms in the market. In this second case we have exactly the same expression for returning
consumers as in (6).
As a result, taking into account the different positions in which the deviant firm may be visited by
a consumer, we get the profits of a deviant non-merging firm:
p˜i(p˜; p˜∗, pˆ∗) = p˜
[
1
n− k
1− xn−k
1− x (1− x+ p˜
∗ − p˜) + r˜nm(p˜∗, pˆ∗) + r˜a(p˜∗, pˆ∗)
]
(7)
Payoff to a deviant merged entity.
We now compute the joint payoff of the (deviating) merging stores. Since consumers expect that
p˜∗ < pˆ∗, they contemplate visiting the stores of the merged entity only after they have visited all
the non-merging firms. Suppose that the merging firms deviate by charging pˆ 6= pˆ∗ and consider a
consumer who walks away from the last non-merging store and observes a deal εi − pˆ at the first
merging store she visits. Such a consumer will never return to any of the non-merged firms without
first visiting all the other merging stores. This is because the utilities from all non-merged firms are
lower than x¯− pˆ∗, which is the reservation utility at any of the merging shops. We now ask whether
11
the consumer will continue searching after she visits the first merging shop. Clearly, she will continue
searching when her best deal so far does not give her positive utility. She will do the same when the
highest utility so far is obtained at one of the non-merging stores, that is, when zn−k− p˜∗ > εi− pˆ > 0.
Finally, when the best deal is the one at the merging store where she currently is, the consumer will
continue searching when εi − pˆ < x¯ − pˆ∗.15 As a result, the probability that the consumer arrives at
the first merging store and buys there right away is16
Pr [εi − pˆ ≥ x− pˆ∗ ≥ max{zn−k − p˜∗}] = (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (1− x+ pˆ∗ − pˆ)
Suppose now that the consumer walks into the hth merged store, h = 2, ..., k. The probability this
consumer buys at that shop right away is
Pr[max{zh−1 − pˆ, zn−k − p˜∗} < x− pˆ∗ < εi − pˆ]
This gives a demand (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)h−1 (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (1− x+ pˆ∗ − pˆ) .
Taking into account the different positions in which a merging firm may be visited, h = 1, 2, ..., k,
we have a demand equal to
k∑
h=1
(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)h−1 (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (1− x¯+ pˆ∗ − pˆ) = (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
[
1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k
]
Some consumers visit all shops in the market and decide to return to one of the merging stores to
conduct a purchase. This occurs with probability Pr [εi ≥ max {zk−1, zn−k + pˆ− p˜∗, pˆ} and εi < x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ] .
Taking into account that consumers can return to any of the merging stores, we obtain the following
demand from “coming-back” consumers:
rˆa(pˆ; p˜
∗, pˆ∗) ≡ k
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(εi + p˜
∗)n−k (εi + pˆ)k−1 dεi (8)
where again the sub-index “a” refers to consumers having visited all the stores in the market.
The payoff to a deviating merged entity is then:
pˆi(pˆ; p˜∗, pˆ∗) = pˆ
{
(x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
[
1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k
]
+ rˆa(·)
}
(9)
15We assume that a buyer who observes a deviation price pˆ at one of the merging stores does not change the expectation
that the other merged firms charge pˆ∗. This assumption can easily be justified by a trembling-hand argument if we think
that prices are decided by the headquarters of the merged entity but price tags are set by the managers of the individual
merged shops and the latter can independently “tremble” with a small but positive probability (we thank an anonymous
referee for this line of argumentation). If consumers did know the merging firm deviates jointly in all its stores, then they
would update their expectations correspondingly and this would lead to a kink in the demand function of the merging
firms. In this situation, downward deviations lead to exactly the same payoff as here. However, upward deviations lead
to a different payoff function, which suggests the existence of multiple equilibria. Our results, however, do not depend
on this. Details can be obtained from the authors upon request.
16We assume here that pˆ < 1− x+ pˆ∗. We check that “large” deviations are not profitable either in the appendix.
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Results
We first study the existence of equilibrium. Taking the first order derivative of the payoff in (7) with
respect to the deviation price p˜ and applying symmetry yields the following FOC for the non-merging
firms:
1− 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗ − (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k + (n− k)
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (10)
Likewise, taking the first order derivative of the payoff in (9) with respect to pˆ and using the equilibrium
requirement that consumer beliefs are correct, i.e., pˆ = pˆ∗ yields the FOC for the merged entity:
(x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
(
1− x¯k − kpˆ∗x¯k−1
)
+ k
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (11)
Proposition 1 Assume that k firms merge. Then, in the short-run, there exists a Nash equilibrium
in the post-merger market where:
• Consumers start searching at the non-merging stores and then, if they wish so, they proceed by
searching at the merged ones.
• Merging firms charge a price pˆ∗ and the non-merging stores charge a price p˜∗; these prices are
given by the unique solution to the system of FOCs (10)-(11) and the price ranking is consistent
with consumer search behavior, that is, pˆ∗ > p˜∗.
This equilibrium exists for any s ∈
[
0, (1− (1 + k)− 1k )2/2
]
.
The proof of this Proposition has the following steps. We first show that there is a unique pair of
prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies the FOCs (10)-(11). We then show that these prices satisfy the inequality
pˆ∗ > p˜∗, which immediately implies that the hypothesized consumer search behavior is optimal. The
equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists for all admissible search costs.
When the potentially merging firms do indeed merge, two effects take place. On the one hand,
since consumers expect the insiders to charge higher prices than the outsiders, consumers push the
merging firms all the way back in the queue they follow when they search for satisfactory products. On
the other hand, there is an internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect, as usual when firms merge.
These effects take place simultaneously but it is illustrative to separate them in a graph.
As in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), because the prices of similar firms are identical, the effects
of a merger can be shown in a two-dimensional graph. In Figure 1a, the crossing point between the two
blue curves gives the pre-merger equilibrium. The line rprek (r
pre
n−k) is the joint reaction of the potential
insiders (outsiders) to a price p˜ (pˆ) charged by the outsiders (insiders), given consumer beliefs that
the equilibrium price is p∗. The curves cross on the 45 degrees line at p∗ so both types of firms charge
p∗ and consumers’ expectations are fulfilled.
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By the search-order effect, outsiders are visited first and insiders later. The pricing problem when
some firms are visited first and the rest later has been studied by Zhou (2009). In his paper, the
so-called prominent firms are first in line and when consumers do not find there a satisfactory product
they continue by searching the so-called non-prominent firms.17 The line rk (rn−k) in Figure 1a is
the joint reaction of the non-prominent (prominent) firms to a price p˜ (pˆ) charged by the prominent
(non-prominent) ones, given consumer beliefs that the equilibrium prices are Zhou’s equilibrium ones.
As we can see, by the search-order effect, the joint reaction curve of the insiders (outsiders) shifts
upwards (leftwards) from rprek (r
pre
n−k) to rk (rn−k). These moves capture the fact that, relative to the
pre-merger situation, the insiders’ demand becomes more inelastic while the outsiders’ demand turns
more elastic. The crossing point between the curves rk and rn−k, {p˜∗1, pˆ∗1}, gives Zhou’s equilibrium of
the pricing game when n− k firms are visited first and the rest k of the firms later.
(a) Search-order effect (b) Internalization of pricing externalities
Figure 1: Short-run pre- and post-merger equilibria (n = 3, k = 2).
The effects of price coordination among the insiders are shown in Figure 1b. The line rpostk (r
post
n−k)
is the joint reaction of the insiders (outsiders) to a price p˜ (pˆ) charged by the outsiders (insiders), given
consumer beliefs that the equilibrium prices are pˆ∗ and p˜∗. The internalization-of-pricing-externalities
effect is captured by the shift from rk (rn−k) to r
post
k (r
post
n−k). The post-merger equilibrium is given by
the crossing point of the two red curves, where consumer expectations are also fulfilled.18
We explore next the relationship between the post-merger equilibrium prices and the pre-merger
equilibrium price. Whether the post-merger equilibrium prices are higher or lower than the pre-merger
equilibrium price is a priori ambiguous. Consider the price charged by the non-merging firms. The fact
17When there is just one prominent firm, Armstrong et al. (2009) show that the price of the prominent firm will be
lower than the price the firms would charge in a symmetric situation. Zhou (2009) qualifies this result demonstrating
that when the number of prominent firms in the market is higher than 1, the price of prominent firms may be higher
than the price firms would charge if they were all symmetric.
18We note that the reaction function of the outsiders also changes because of the change in consumer expectations.
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that the potentially merging stores by actually merging confer the non-merging stores a “prominent”
position in the marketplace causes a direct downward pressure on the price of the non-merging firms.
As said before, this is because when a firm becomes prominent its pool of consumers becomes more
elastic. In addition there are two indirect effects. The first is that, since the merging firms are relegated
to the last positions of the queue consumers follow when they search, they tend to raise their prices.
This is because for the non-prominent firms it holds the opposite, namely, that their demand becomes
less elastic. By strategic complementarity, the latter effect weakens competition in the marketplace
and the non-merging firms tend to raise their prices as well. The second effect follows from the fact
that the merging firms internalize the pricing externalities they confer on one another. This also tends
to raise their price, and indirectly, by strategic complementarity again, the prices of the non-merging
firms. Similar considerations apply to the price of the merging firms. Our next proposition shows that
when the search-order effects are not very strong then all prices increase after a merger.19
Proposition 2 In the short-run post-merger equilibrium of Proposition 1, the ranking of pre- and
post-merger equilibrium prices is p∗ < p˜∗ < pˆ∗ whenever one of the following conditions holds: (a) the
search cost is sufficiently low, (b) the search cost is sufficiently high, (c) the number of firms n = 3.
We study next the issue of merger profitability. As expected, the case in which search cost is
small reproduces naturally the situation in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). However, as search costs
increase, fewer consumers walk away from the non-merging stores and visit the merged ones. This fall
in consumer traffic from the outsiders to the insiders turns out to be fatal for the latter.
Proposition 3 In the short-run post-merger equilibrium of Proposition 1:
1. Any 2-firm merger is not profitable if the search cost is sufficiently high.
2. Any arbitrary k-firm merger is not profitable if the search cost and the number of competitors
are sufficiently high.
3. If search costs are sufficiently small, any arbitrary k-firm merger is profitable.
Proposition 3 shows that, unless there are many firms in the industry and the merger comprises
almost all of them, eventually as the search cost becomes relatively high merging is not individually
rational for the merging firms. The interest of this Proposition is that it puts forward a new merger
paradox, which arises under price competition with differentiated products. The underlying reason
is based on search costs, something quite different from the merger paradox of Salant et al. (1983),
which concerns competition with decision variables that are strategic substitutes.20
19We note, however, that solving numerically the model we have found no example in which this does not happen.
20We are implicitly assuming that the non-merging firms can absorb the (possibly large) post-merger increase in
consumer traffic toward their stores. If firms were capacity constrained, this result would have to be qualified. In
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Propositions 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 2, where we plot the post-merger equilibrium prices,
pˆ∗ and p˜∗, against search costs. For comparison purposes, we also plot the pre-merger price, p∗. All
prices are increasing in search costs.21 As searching for price and product fit becomes more costly,
firms have more market power over the consumers who pay them a visit and this results in higher
prices for all the firms. As the graph reveals, post-merger prices, whether from merging or non-merging
firms, happen to be higher than the pre-merger price.
(a) Prices (b) Profits
Figure 2: Pre- and post-merger prices, and merger profitability (n = 3, k = 2).
Figure 2b shows how the profits of a merging firm and a non-merging firm, pˆi∗/k and p˜i∗, vary with
search costs. In addition, the figure gives the pre-merger profits, pi∗, so we can readily assess whether
consolidation is worthwhile for the merging parties. Profits of a merging firm decline as search cost goes
up. The reason is that, as the search cost increases, fewer consumers walk away from the non-merging
firm and visit the shops of the merged entity. This has a major implication on merger profitability:
for search costs approximately above 0.018 (3.6% of the average value of a firm’s product), merging
is not individually rational for the merging firms. The graph also reveals that the non-merging firm
“gets a free ride” and that “this ride is freer” the higher the search cost.
3.2 Long-run effects of mergers
In this section we take a medium- to long-term view of mergers and assume that, after a more or less
complex process of business reorganization, the merged entity starts selling the k products of the k
mother firms in all its shops. Alternatively, we can assume that the merged entity shuts down all its
shops but one, where it stocks the k varieties stemming from the k original merging firms. Irrespective
of the precise reorganization, we assume that consumers know about it so they can take it into account
addition, as mentioned above, we are abstracting from any cost-synergies. If, as in Farrel and Shapiro (1990), the
insiders did lower their costs of production as a result of the merger and consequently lowered their prices below those
of the outsiders, then the situation would be quite the opposite.
21For a proof of this, see our working paper Moraga-Gonza´lez and Petrikaite˙ (2011).
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when deciding which type of firm to visit first.22
In this section we maintain the assumption that23
s ∈
[
0,min
{
1
8
,
k
k + 1
[
1− (k + 2)(k + 1)− k+1k
]}]
(12)
As before, let p˜∗ and pˆ∗ denote the equilibrium prices of the non-merging and merging firms,
respectively. To characterize the post-merger equilibrium we need to write out the payoffs of the
different types of firms. These payoffs in turn depend on the optimal consumer search behavior,
which, of course, has to be consistent with equilibrium pricing.
We then proceed by first specifying the order in which consumers will visit the two types of firms,
then calculating equilibrium prices and finally checking back the consistency of the search rule. The
trade-off for a consumer is clear: relative to the deal offered by a non-merging firm, at the merged
entity the consumer encounters more variety but probably, though not surely, at higher prices.24
To characterize the order of search, we invoke again Weitzman’s (1979) results. Let x be the
solution to ∫ 1
x
(ε− x)kεk−1dε− s = 0 (13)
As in (1), x represents a threshold match value above which a consumer will decide not to continue
searching the products of the merged entity. Correspondingly, the number x−pˆ∗ defines the reservation
utility for searching the k products of the merged entity. Likewise, x− p˜∗ is the reservation utility for
searching the product of a non-merging store, where x, is again given by (1).
Momentarily, assume x − pˆ∗ > x − p˜∗; given this, Weitzman’s optimal search rule prescribes
consumers to visit first the merged entity. To calculate the post-merger equilibrium prices, we proceed
by computing the payoffs the (merging and non-merging) firms would obtain when deviating from the
equilibrium prices. Then we derive the FOCs and solve for equilibrium prices. After this we look for
conditions under which the inequality x− pˆ∗ > x− p˜∗ indeed holds. Later in Section 4 we prove that
the symmetric equilibrium we derive here is the unique symmetric equilibrium provided that search
costs are sufficiently large.
22Absent any form of fixed costs of keeping shops open, these two alternative business organizations yield exactly the
same payoff. In fact, the demand of a merging store in the first case is equal to the demand of the unique merging store
in the second case divided by k. The reason is simply that the decision to walk away from a merging store and visit a
non-merging store, or the other way around, is exactly the same in the two settings.
23One more time we need to make sure that the first search is always worth. If a consumer contemplates to visit first a
non-merging firm, the condition s ≤ 1/8 suffices. However, if the consumer contemplates to go first to the merged entity,
we need that s ≤ Pr[zk ≥ pmk ]E[zk − pmk | zk ≥ pmk ]. Using the facts that pmk = (k + 1)−1/k and the distribution of zk is
εk we obtain the bound k
k+1
[
1− (k + 2)(k + 1)−(k+1)/k
]
.
24To be sure, the price of the merged entity need not be higher than the price of the non-merging firms. While merging
firms internalize pricing externalities and this pushes prices up (relative to the non-merging stores), if the merged entity
is visited first then, as mentioned above, market prominence pushes prices down (Armstrong et al., 2009; Haan and
Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2011; Zhou, 2009). As we will see later, if the merged entity is visited first by the consumers in an
equilibrium, it can very well be the case that it charges a lower price than that of the non-merging stores.
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Payoff to a deviant merging store.
Since consumers expect the price set by the merged entity to be pˆ∗, and since we have assumed search
costs to be low enough, consumers will surely make a first search. Upon arrival at the merged entity,
they may be surprised by a deviation price, denoted by pˆ 6= pˆ∗.
Let zk − pˆ be the deal observed by the consumer at the merged entity. A consumer stops there
and buys right away if the expected gains from further search are lower than the search cost. Since
consumers believe the non-merging firms to be charging p˜∗, the probability that a buyer stops searching
at the merged entity is equal to 1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ)k provided, again, that the deviating price is not too
high.25
The merged entity also receives demand from consumers who decide to walk away from it, visit all
the non-merging firms and finally return to it because the deal offered by the merged entity is in the
end the best in the market. This happens with probability:
Pr [zk − pˆ < x− p˜∗ and zk − pˆ > max{zn−k − p˜∗, 0}] ,
which gives a demand from “coming-back” consumers equal to
cˆa(pˆ; p˜
∗, pˆ∗) =
∫ x−p˜∗+pˆ
pˆ
(ε− pˆ+ p˜∗)n−k dεk = k
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε (14)
where the subindex “a” refers to the fact that consumers come back to the merging firm after having
visited all firms in the market.
The total profit of the merged entity therefore equals:
pˆi(pˆ; p˜∗, pˆ∗) = pˆ
[
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ)k + cˆa(pˆ; p˜∗, pˆ∗)
]
(15)
Payoff to a deviant non-merging store.
We now compute the payoff of a non-merging store that deviates from p˜∗ by charging p˜ 6= p˜∗. As
all non-merging firms are expected to charge p˜∗, consumers are supposed to visit them randomly.
Therefore the deviant firm may be visited in first place after the merged entity, in second place and
so on till the n− kth place.
Consider that the deviant non-merging firm is visited by a consumer in her hth search after walking
away from the merged entity, with h = 1, 2, ..., n− k.26 Suppose the deal the consumer observes upon
entering the deviant’s shop is εj − p˜. There are two situations in which the deviant sells to this
consumer. First, the consumer may stop searching at this shop and buy there right away. Using the
25In the appendix we deal with the case of “large” deviations, i.e. deviations where pˆ > 1−x+ p˜∗ and correspondingly
all consumers walk away from the merged entity.
26We note that when the consumer visits the deviant immediately after leaving the merged firm, h = 1, the consumer,
even if surprised by a deviation, never wants to return to the merged entity without searching further. If fact, this event
has probability Pr[zk − pˆ∗ < x− p˜∗and ε− p˜ > x− p˜∗ and zk − pˆ∗ > ε− p˜] = 0.
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search logic described above, conditional on the consumer visiting the non-merging firm j in her hth
search, this occurs when εj ≥ x− p˜∗+ p˜. The probability the deviant is visited in hth place is 1/(n−k).
Therefore, the joint probability a consumer visits the deviant in hth place and buys there directly is
1
n− k Pr[zk − pˆ
∗ < x− p˜∗ and zh−1 < x and εj − p˜ > x− p˜∗]
Taking into account that the deviant may be visited by the consumer in positions h = 1, 2, ..., n − k,
total demand in this case is equal to27
1
n− k
n−k∑
h=1
(x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)kxh−1 (1− x+ p˜∗ − p˜) (16)
Second, the consumer may walk away from the deviant firm and come back to it after checking
the products of all stores. This occurs when
Pr [zk − pˆ∗ < x− p˜∗ and zn−k−1 < x and εj − p˜ < x− p˜∗ and εj − p˜ > max{zk − pˆ∗, zn−k−1 − p˜∗, 0}] ,
After manipulation, this gives a demand from come-back consumers equal to
c˜a(p˜; p˜
∗pˆ∗) ≡
∫ x−p˜∗+p˜
p˜
(ε+ pˆ∗ − p˜)k(ε+ p˜∗ − p˜)n−k−1dε =
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1dε (17)
Again the subindex “a” denotes that this demand stems from consumers who visit all the shops. Note
that this probability does not depend on h.
Taking into account (16) and (17) we obtain the profits of a non-merging firm:
p˜i(p˜, p˜∗pˆ∗) = p˜
[
1
n− k
1− xn−k
1− x (x− p˜
∗ + pˆ∗)k (1− x+ p˜∗ − p˜) + c˜a(·)
]
(18)
Results
Taking the first order derivative in (15) and requiring that consumer beliefs coincide with the actual
price of the merged entity, i.e. pˆ = pˆ∗, we obtain the following FOC:
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 (x− p˜∗ + (k + 1) pˆ∗) + k
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (19)
Likewise, taking the FOC in (18) and imposing symmetry among the prices of the non-merging firms,
i.e. p˜ = p˜∗, gives:
1
n− k (x− p˜
∗ + pˆ∗)k
1− xn−k
1− x (1− x− p˜
∗) +
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (20)
Proposition 4 Assume that k ≤ 10 firms merge. Then in the long-run after the merged entity stocks
all the products of the parent firms there exists a Nash equilibrium in the post-merger market where:
27Once more we are assuming here that the deviation is “small”. Deviations to prices p˜ > 1− x+ p˜∗ are dealt with in
the appendix.
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• Consumers prefer start searching at the merged entity and then, if they wish so, continue search-
ing at the non-merging firms.
• The merged entity charges a price pˆ∗ and the non-merging stores charge a price p˜∗; these prices
solve the system of FOCs (19)-(20).
This equilibrium exists if the search cost s is sufficiently large, in which case x− pˆ∗ ≥ x− p˜∗ and
pˆ∗ ≥ p˜∗.
The proof has three steps. We first prove that there exists at least one solution to the system of
FOCs (19)-(20). We then show that this solution is unique. Finally, we show that when the search cost
is large, consumer putative search order (i.e. first visit the merged entity and then the non-merging
firms) is consistent with equilibrium pricing.28
As we did in the previous subsection, it is illustrative to look at the behavior of the reaction
functions of the different types of firm once a merger takes place. We illustrate the main effects in
Figure 3. As before, the crossing point between the two blue reaction functions gives the pre-merger
equilibrium. Again, when the potentially merging firms do indeed merge a search-order effect and a
internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect take place.
(a) Search-order effect (b) Internalization of pricing externalities
Figure 3: Long-run pre- and post-merger equilibria (n = 3, k = 2).
The search-order effect stems from the demand-side economies that unfold when the merging stores
start carrying all the products of the parent firms. By this effect, the reaction curve of the outsiders
(insiders) shifts rightwards (downwards) from rpren−k (r
pre
k ) to rn−k (rk). This move is driven by the
28The restriction k ≤ 10 is adopted for convenience. If k is larger than 11 the search cost bound in (12) is a complicated
function of k and this makes the calculations cumbersome. Since mergers are relevant in relatively concentrated markets
and often take place between 2 firms at most, the restriction k ≤ 10 implies little loss of generality. Obviously, the
restriction n ≤ 10 is equivalent.
20
fact that the demand of a non-merging firm becomes more inelastic after the search-order changes.
The crossing point between rn−k and rk determines the price implications of the search-order effect.
The usual internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect shifts the joint reaction function of the insiders
(outsiders) further from rk (rn−k) to r
post
k (r
post
n−k). At the post-merger equilibrium, all prices, whether
from outsiders or insiders, increase. Proposition 4 shows that when search costs are sufficiently large,
the merged entity charges a higher price than the price of the non-merging firms. This means that
the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect dominates the search-order effect. Still, the trade-off
consumers face turns out to be favorable for the merging firms: consumers prefer to start searching
at the merged entity despite the fact that this firm has a higher price. Economies of search are at the
heart of this result.
Before turning to a discussion of the aggregate implications of mergers, we make two remarks in
connection with Proposition 4. The first observation is that, even though the proof of the proposition
uses the case where the search cost converges to its maximum value, the result is true for much lower
search costs. This can be seen in Figure 4a, where we plot the reservation utilities x− pˆ∗ and x− p˜∗
against search costs for the n = 3 case. The equilibrium of Proposition 4 exists for search costs to the
right of the point where the two reservation utility curves intersect (approximately 0.015, i.e., 3% of
the average value of a firm’s good). In Figure 4b we see that the price of the merged entity is higher
than the price of the non-merging firm no matter the level of search costs.
(a) Reservation utilities (b) Prices
Figure 4: Reservation utilities, prices and search costs (n = 3, k = 2).
However, our second observation is that the ranking of merging and non-merging firm prices given
in Proposition 4 need not hold for all parameters. In fact, it is indeed possible that the search-order
effect more than offsets the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect, in which case the merged
entity charges a price lower than the non-merging stores. This occurs when the search cost is relatively
small and the number of merging firms relative to the total number of firms in the market is also small.
In the graphs of Figure 5, the number of merging firms is set equal to 2 and the search cost is very
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small (s = 0.005). Figure 5a plots the post-merger equilibrium prices and shows that the merged
entity charges a price lower than that of the non-merging firms when n ≥ 7. Figure 5b plots consumer
reservation utilities for searching the two types of firms and shows that consumer search order is
consistent with equilibrium pricing for all n ≥ 4.
(a) Prices (b) Reservation utilities
Figure 5: Post-merger prices and reservation utilities (x = 0.9, k = 2).
We now turn to the impact of merging activity on the profits of insiders and outsiders to a merger.
Proposition 5 In the long-run post-merger equilibrium of Proposition 4:
1. Any k-firm merger is individually rational for the merging firms, that is, pˆi∗/k > pi∗.
2. If search cost is sufficiently large, in any k-firm merger the non-merging firms obtain lower profits
than the merging firms, that is, pˆi∗/k > p˜i∗.
In the short-run equilibrium of Proposition 3 firms did not have an incentive to merge when the
search costs are high. The reason is that, everything else equal, the merging firms are pushed to
the end of consumers’ search order. In the long-run, by contrast, firms that merge gain a prominent
position in the marketplace because their shops are stocked with a larger array of products. This
clearly makes merging profitable in the long-run and, in addition, has a serious impact on the profits
of the non-merging firms. In fact, Proposition 5 shows that, when search frictions are high, the non-
merging firms obtain lower profits than the merged entity. The non-merging firms, being relegated to
the end of the optimal search order consumers follow when they search for satisfactory deals, receive
little custom when search costs are high and, correspondingly, lose out relative to the merging firms.
This result is in contrast with the standard “free-riding effect” by which outsiders to a merger benefit
more than the insiders. To the extent that the free-riding effect is at odds with observed merger waves,
our result is more comforting.
Figure 6 illustrates these results on profits. It can be seen that the merged entity’s profits (red
curve) are clearly above pre-merger levels (blue curve). As explained before, this is the outcome of
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Figure 6: Long-run pre- and post-merger equilibrium profits (n = 3, k = 2).
two forces: one the one hand, the merged entity benefits from the market prominence it gains by
stocking all the products from the parent firms in the merged entity; on the other hand, the merged
entity profits from increased market power. The figure also shows that, unless search costs are very
low, outsiders lose out (red curve). Finally, it is also worth mentioning the asymmetry in the way
search costs affect the profits of the different firms after a merger. As search costs increase, the profits
of the merged entity go up while the profits of the non-merging firms typically fall. This is due to the
fact that as search costs increase consumer traffic from the merged entity to the non-merging firms
decreases.
Our final result pertains to the aggregate implications of mergers. As usual, we evaluate the effects
of a merger on welfare grounds by comparing the pre- and post-merger un-weighted sum of consumer
surplus and firms’ profits. We now compute the expected surplus consumers derive in the post-merger
market. Consider first those consumers who buy from the merged entity. As explained above, these
consumers either buy there directly upon arrival or after having visited all the non-merging firms. Let
ĈS denote the gross-of-search-costs expected surplus of the clientele of the merged entity:
ĈS =
∫ 1
x−p˜∗+pˆ∗
(ε− pˆ∗) dεk +
∫ x−p˜∗+pˆ∗
pˆ∗
(ε− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (ε− pˆ∗) dεk (21)
Consider now those consumers who buy from the non-merging firms. Similarly to the consumers who
buy from the merged entity, these consumers may buy directly upon arrival or after visiting all the
firms in the market. Let C˜S denote the gross-of-search-costs expected surplus of the clientele of the
non-merging firms:
C˜S = (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k 1− x
n−k
1− x
∫ 1
x
(ε− p˜∗) dε+ (n− k)
∫ x
p˜∗
εn−k−1 (ε− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k (ε− p˜∗) dε. (22)
In the long-run post-merger equilibrium search economies play an important role. Consumers who
buy directly at the merged entity search only one time. Those who walk away and stop at the first
non-merging store they visit search only two times. And so on and so forth. Denoting by NS the
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total number of searches we have:
NS = 1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k + (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k (1− x)
n−k∑
j=1
(j + 1)xj−1 + (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k xn−k(n− k + 1)
Denoting the total search costs incurred by consumers by Sc, after simplification, we obtain
Sc =
1
2
(1− x)
[
1− x+ (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k (1− xn−k)
]
, (23)
which, keeping prices fixed, clearly decreases in k.29 The total net-of-search-costs expected consumer
surplus is therefore CS = ĈS + C˜S − Sc. Adding the profits of the firms, we obtain a measure of
expected social welfare SW = CS + pˆi + (n− k)p˜i.
Proposition 6 In the long-run post-merger equilibrium of Proposition 4, if search cost is high enough:
1. Any k-firm merger results in an increase in industry profits.
2. Consumer surplus increases after a k-firm merger.
As a result, social welfare increases after a merger has taken place.
The aggregate implications of a merger are illustrated in Figure 7. In Figure 7a we compare pre-
and post-merger collective profits. Collectively firms obtain greater profits post-merger (red curve)
than pre-merger (blue curve).
(a) Industry profits (b) Consumer surplus
Figure 7: Long-run pre- and post-merger profits and consumer surplus (n = 3, k = 2).
Figure 7b depicts pre- and post-merger consumer surplus and social welfare. The graph illustrates
our result in Proposition 6 that when search cost is relatively high, consumer search economies more
than offset the negative price effects of consolidation thereby increasing the welfare of consumers.
When search costs are intermediate, the price effects are stronger than the search economies and
29In fact, numerical calculations show that the total search costs also decrease in k when we take into account how
prices change with k.
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consumers lose out; however, their loss is not so large because of the savings in search costs so overall
welfare increases. When search costs converge to zero, the usual negative price effects associated to
consolidation lead to welfare losses as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
4 Discussion
The most important results of the paper are about situations in which search costs are relatively high
for otherwise the model is similar to the perfect information case of Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
In particular, in Section 3.1 on the short-run effects of mergers, we have shown that mergers are not
individually rational when search costs are relatively high. Likewise, in Section 3.2 on the long-run
effects of mergers, we have proven that demand-side economies can make mergers welfare improving
when search costs are relatively high. The purpose of this Section is to argue that when search costs
are high, the equilibria given in Propositions 1 and 4 are the only symmetric equilibria.
The short-run
The discussion in Section 3.1 centered around a symmetric equilibrium with the merging firms charging
a higher price than the non-merging firms and, correspondingly, consumers starting their search for
satisfactory products at the non-merging stores. This equilibrium is the natural extension of the
equilibrium that arises under perfect information (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) because, due to
the internalization-of-pricing externalities effect, we expect the merging firms to charge higher, rather
than lower, prices than the non-merging firms. As shown in Proposition 1, this equilibrium exists for
all admissible levels of the search cost.
However, as we mentioned above when we discussed the potential problems associated with the in-
determinacy of consumer beliefs about which type of firms charge the lowest prices, another symmetric
equilibrium can be proposed. In such alternative symmetric equilibrium, consumers hold the belief
that the merging stores charge lower prices than those of the non-merging firms and, correspondingly,
they start their search for satisfactory products at the former; firms respond by setting prices in such
a way that consumer beliefs are fulfilled. This could very well occur if the merger process looms so
large in consumer minds that the merging firms capture consumer attention and become prominent
in the market. In that case, the power of consumer beliefs at dictating the prices of the firms must be
sufficiently strong so as to more than offset the internalization-of-pricing externalities effect. In this
Section we focus attention on such an alternative equilibrium.
Since in this alternative equilibrium consumers start their search for satisfactory products by
visiting the shops of the merged entity, we can borrow the payoffs of the different types of firms from
the analysis in Section 3.2. The only difference between the situation described there and the new one
here in that in Section 3.2 the merged entity stocks all the products of the parent firms in each of its
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shops. But this difference turns out to be inconsequential for the payoffs of both firms. Let us explain
why.
Here, the demand of a non-merging firm j is made of consumers who walk away from all the
merging stores, happen to stop by firm j and buy right away there; or, else, by consumers returning
to firm j after having visited all shops. The decision to walk away from the very last merging store
is based on the comparison between zk − pˆ∗ and x − p˜∗. This condition is exactly the same as that
in Section 3.2 for consumers to leave the merged entity and visit one of the non-merging stores. As a
result, the payoff of a (deviant) non-merging firm here is exactly the same as (18).
We now examine the joint demand of the merging stores. We can assume without loss of generality
that the merging stores are visited in a particular order, say, first the merging store 1, then the merging
store 2 and so on all the way till the merging store k. Consider a consumer who starts searching and
visits the first merging store. If the match value encountered there is less than x¯− pˆ∗+ pˆ, the consumer
will continue searching and visit a second merging firm. Otherwise, the buyer will acquire the product
sold there right away. In the second shop, and all the way till the (k − 1)th store the trade-off faced
by the consumer is exactly the same. Therefore, the direct demand obtained by the first k− 1 merged
stores is
k−1∑
i=1
(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)i−1 (1− x¯+ pˆ∗ − pˆ) = 1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k−1
When a consumer arrives at the kth merging firm, the situation a consumer faces is different because
the firm to be visited next is a non-merging firm and this type of firm charges a different price, namely
p˜∗. As a result, the consumer may take one of three decisions. First, the consumer may terminate her
search at the last merging store. This occurs when the match value there is higher than at the other
merging stores and it is not worth to continue searching further at the non-merging stores, i.e., with
probability Pr [εk − pˆ > max {x¯− p˜∗; zk−1 − pˆ}] , and this gives a demand equal to
(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k−1 (1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)) + 1
k
[
(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k − (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ)k
]
Second, the consumer may return to one of the previously visited merging stores. This can occur
because, since pˆ∗ < p˜∗ by assumption, the decision to walk away from the previously visited shops,
i.e., zk−1 − pˆ < x¯− pˆ∗ does not necessarily imply the consumer will continue searching after getting a
bad deal at the last merging store. The probability the consumer returns to a given previously visited
merging store is Pr [x¯− pˆ∗ > zk−1 − pˆ > max {x¯− p˜∗; εk − pˆ}] . Since there are k − 1 such stores, the
fraction of consumers who return to a previously visited merging store without visiting all shops in
the market is
rˆm(pˆ; p˜
∗, pˆ∗) ≡ k − 1
k
[
(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k − (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ)k
]
,
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where the sub-index m refers to the fact that these consumers return to a merging store after visiting
only the merging stores.
Finally, the consumer may walk away from the last merging store, continue to visit the rest of the
(non-merging) stores and return to one of the merging stores to conduct a purchase. This fraction of
consumers, which we denote rˆa to refer to the situation that consumers come back to one of the merging
stores after visiting all firms in the market, is given by Pr [x¯− p˜∗ > zk − pˆ > max {0; zn−k − p˜∗}] , that
is
rˆa(pˆ; p˜
∗, pˆ∗) ≡ k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
Putting these demands together, we obtain a payoff for the (deviant) merging store that is exactly the
same as that given by (15).
But can such an equilibrium exist for all parameters? From the received theory we know that
when the search cost is exactly equal to zero (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985), such price ranking is
impossible. By continuity’ we expect this alternative equilibrium to fail to exist when the search cost
is positive but small. This is indeed what our next result shows. In addition, we can prove that the
same is true when the search cost is very high or for example when the number of firms is 3 or very
large.
Proposition 7 Assume that k firms merge. Then, in the short-run, a symmetric Nash equilibrium
where pˆ∗ < p˜∗ so that consumers start searching at the stores of the merged entity and then proceed by
searching at the non-merging stores does not exist whenever one of the following conditions holds: (a)
the search cost is sufficiently low, (b) the search cost is sufficiently high, (c) n = 3, (d) the number of
competitors is sufficiently large.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The price ranking of the firms is the outcome of the
tension between the search-order effect, which pushes merging firms that are visited first to lower prices
relative to the non-merging firms, and the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect, which works in
the opposite direction. The magnitude of the search cost and the number of non-merging firms affect
the outcome of this tension. In fact, note that the search-order effect is practically non-existent when
the search cost is arbitrarily close to zero, while the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect is the
strongest. In this case, the second effect has a dominating influence and this explains the first part of
the result in Proposition 7. When the search cost increases, the search-order effect gains importance,
while the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect loses strength. For intermediate levels of the
search cost, the alternative equilibrium where the merging firms charge lower prices and are visited
first may exist (though not necessarily as demonstrated for the case n = 3). Finally, when search
costs are very high, prices, whether from merging or not merging firms, are close to monopoly prices
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and the search-order effect loses again against the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect.30 The
number of firms affects the tension between the search-order effect and the internalization-of-pricing-
externalities effect in a similar way.
Proposition 7 implies that the alternative equilibrium where merging firms charge lower prices
and are visited first can only exist for intermediate levels of the search cost and the number of firms.
This casts doubts about the appeal of such equilibrium. At the very least, taking such an alternative
equilibrium seriously requires consumer beliefs to be discontinuous in parameters such as search costs
and the number of firms. We find such requirement on beliefs difficult to justify.
The long-run
In Section 3.2 we have characterized an equilibrium where the potentially merging firms gain market
prominence if they indeed merge. This gain in prominence arises because the merging firms choose
to sell all their products under the same roof. If this is so, and provided search costs are sufficiently
large, consumers find it optimal to first search the products of the merged entity to continue later, if
desired, searching the products of the non-merging firms.
The reader may ask whether other symmetric equilibria are possible. In this section we argue that
the equilibrium in Proposition 4 is unique when search costs are indeed relatively high. We prove this
by contradiction. Suppose that consumers find it optimal to start searching for a satisfactory good at
the non-merging firms. If this is so, then the reservation utility at the merged entity, x− pˆ∗, must be
lower than the reservation utility at the non-merging firms, x¯− p˜∗ (where x and x, as before, solve (1)
and (13), respectively) (cf. Weitzman, 1979).
Since consumers visit first the non-merging firms, we can borrow from the analysis in Section 3.1
to write out here the payoff functions of the different firms. In what follows we argue that the payoff
functions of merged and non-merged firms here have exactly the same form as those in (7) and (9).
The only difference comes from the fact that the reservation value for visiting the merged entity is
now x− pˆ∗ instead of x− pˆ∗.
Consider the payoff of the merged entity when it deviates to pˆ 6= pˆ∗. Consumers will walk away from
the last non-merging store and arrive at the merged entity if the best of the non-merging firms’ deals is
lower than x− pˆ∗. Therefore, the merged entity will only receive demand when its offer is the best of all
offers in the market, that is, with probability Pr
[
zn−k − p˜∗ < x− pˆ∗ and zk − pˆ > max {0; zn−k − p˜∗}
]
.
30We have explored alternative ways to affect the trade-off between the search-order effect and the internalization-
of-pricing-externalities effect and rule out the alternative equilibrium where the merging firms charge lower prices and
are visited first. What is important is to weaken the power consumer beliefs have at dictating equilibrium prices. For
example, one can show that this equilibrium fails to exist when there is a sufficiently large number of consumers who have
perfect information (see Moraga-Gonza´lez and Petrikaite˙, 2011). The equilibrium in Proposition 1 by contrast survives
this modification as well as our merger paradox result in Proposition 3.
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This gives a payoff for the merged entity equal to
pˆi(pˆ; p˜∗, pˆ∗) = pˆ
{(
x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k [1− (x− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k]+ k ∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε
}
which is exactly identical to (9) except in that x is here replaced by x.
We now look at the payoff of a (deviant) non-merging firm. We only need to modify the payoff
in (7) by properly taking into account that the decision to walk away from the last non-merging firm
and visit the merged entity depends on whether the best of the non-merging firms’ deals is lower than
x−pˆ∗. This affects, on the one hand, the probability consumers return to the deviant merging firm after
having visited all the non-merging firms, which becomes Pr[max{zn−k−1− p˜∗, x− pˆ∗} < ε˜j− p˜ < x− p˜∗]
and therefore r˜nm(·) is modified to
d˜nm(·) ≡ 1
n− k
[
xn−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k]
and, on the other hand, the probability consumers return to the deviant merging firm after having
visited all the firms in the market, which becomes Pr[max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, zk − pˆ∗, 0} < ε˜j − p˜ < x− pˆ∗]
and therefore r˜a(·) becomes
d˜a(·) ≡
∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(εj + p˜
∗)n−k−1 (εj + pˆ∗)k dεj .
As a result, the total payoff of a deviating non-merging firm equals:
p˜i(p˜; p˜∗, pˆ∗) = p˜
[
1
n− k
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ (1− x¯+ p˜
∗ − p˜) + d˜nm(·) + d˜a(·)
]
,
which is similar to (7).
Proposition 8 Assume that k ≤ 10 firms merge and that the search cost is sufficiently high. Then
in the long-run after the merged entity stocks all the products of parent firms in each of its stores, an
equilibrium where consumers prefer to search first the products of the non-merging firms and then, if
they wish so, the products of the merged entity does not exist.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the aggregate consequences of mergers in environments where consumers have
to search in order to find satisfactory goods. We have used a model where firms compete in prices to
sell differentiated products and consumers search sequentially to find price and product fit information.
When the search cost is equal to zero, the model collapses to Perloff and Salop (1985) and merger
analysis gives results similar to those in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). However, when search costs
are sizable, the price divergence between merging and non-merging firms has implications for the order
in which consumers visit firms when they search for good deals.
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We have distinguished between the short-run and the long-run effects of mergers. In the short-run,
the merging firms coordinate their prices while everything else stays the same. We have shown that
when search costs are relatively high, the unique post-merger symmetric equilibrium has the merging
stores charging higher prices than the non-merging ones and consumers, correspondingly, visiting first
the non-merging stores and then, if necessary, the stores of the merged entity. In such environment, we
have proven that merging may be unprofitable. The paper has thus shown that a merger paradox may
also arise when firms compete in prices to sell differentiated products. The paradox may arise because
the insiders of a merger by actually merging put themselves at a disadvantage in the marketplace:
consumers visit first the outsider and cheaper firms and then, if unsatisfied with the products available
there, proceed by visiting the insider and more expensive firms.
In the long-run, however, we have argued that the merged entity can choose to sell all the products
of the parent firms in each of its stores; alternatively, the merged entity may stock the shelves of a single
shop with all the products of the parent firms and shut down the rest of the shops if economical. When
search costs are significant, this business reorganization generates substantial demand-side economies
because, everything else equal, consumers do not need to search as intensively as in the pre-merger
situation to find satisfactory products. In contrast to a large literature on cost synergies and supply-
side economies, this paper has emphasized the importance of these demand-side economies for the
aggregate implications of merger activity. We have shown that firms that merge may gain a prominent
position in the marketplace, in which case their incentives to raise prices are seriously dampened. In
that case, consumers prefer to start searching for satisfactory products at the merged entity. In
equilibrium, insider firms gain customers and increase their profits, while outsider firms lose out
because they are pushed all the way back in the optimal search order consumers follow when they
search for products. Importantly, we have shown that consolidation may create sufficiently large search
economies so as to generate rents for consumers too.
We believe the arguments in this paper are novel and useful to further understand the effects
of consolidation processes. Our merger paradox arises in a market where strategic variables are
complement and our merger defence result is based on demand-side economies arising from sources
other than complementarities (network externalities, complement products, one-stop shopping of an
array of products, etc.) Moreover, because the main mechanisms at play are intuitive and powerful,
they are expected to play a role in more general market settings provided search costs are significant.
Ultimately, we hope this paper adds to a finer design of merger policy.
Efficiency gains arising from mergers may take a relatively long time to materialize. Our theory
points out that after-merger business reorganization may lead to important search economies that in
the long-run may even result in price decreases relative to the short-run. Whether supply- or demand-
side economies are at the heart of after-merger potential welfare gains remains an empirical question.
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Developing methods to quantify the importance of economies of search and cost synergies seems a
fascinating area for future empirical research.
31
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is organized in three Claims. Claim 1 shows that there is a pair
of prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies the FOCs (10) and (11). Claim 2 shows that such a pair of prices is
unique. Finally, Claim 3 demonstrates that p˜∗ < pˆ∗. Finally, we check that “large” deviations are not
profitable either. In what follows, we drop the “∗” super-indexes to shorten the expressions.
Claim 1 There is at least one pair of prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies (10) and (11).
Proof. We first rewrite the FOC (11) as G (pˆ, p˜) = 0, where
G (pˆ, p˜) ≡ 1− x
k
kxk−1
− pˆ+ g (pˆ, p˜) (24)
and
g (pˆ, p˜) ≡
∫ x−pˆ
0 (ε+ pˆ)
k−2 (ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε
(x− pˆ+ p˜)n−k xk−1
Since G is continuously differentiable, the FOC G (pˆ, p˜) = 0 defines an implicit relationship between
pˆ and p˜. Let the function η1(p˜) define this relationship. This function is represented in Figure 8 below.
By the implicit function theorem we have
∂η1 (p˜)
∂p˜
= −∂G/∂p˜
∂G/∂pˆ
= − ∂g/∂p˜
∂g/∂pˆ− 1 , (25)
The numerator of (25) is positive. This is because
∂g
∂p˜
=
n− k
xk−1 (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−k+1
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (x− pˆ− ε) dε > 0
The denominator of (25) is however negative. To see this, we note first that
x¯k−1 (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−k+1
[
∂g
∂pˆ
− 1
]
= (n− k)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε
+ (x¯− pˆ+ p˜) (k − 1)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
− (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k+1 x¯k−2 [2x¯+ (k − 1) pˆ] . (26)
Assuming k > 2, let us take the derivative of the RHS of (26) with respect to x¯. After simplifying it,
we obtain:
−x¯k−2 (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k [x¯ (n− k + 2) + (k − 1) pˆ] + (k − 1)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
(27)
If we now take the derivative of (27) with respect to x¯ and simplify it we get
− (n− k) x¯k−2 (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k−1 [x¯ (n+ 1) + p˜ (k − 1)] < 0.
This implies that the derivative of the RHS of (26) with respect to x¯, given in equation (27), is
decreasing in x¯. Setting x¯ equal to its lowest value, pˆ, in (27) gives
−pˆk−2p˜n−k [pˆ (n− k + 2) + (k − 1) pˆ] < 0.
As a result, the RHS of (26) is also decreasing in x¯. If we set now x¯ = pˆ in the RHS of (26), we
obtain −p˜∗n−k+1pˆk−1 (k + 1) < 0. From this we conclude that (26) is negative. As a result, since the
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numerator of ∂η1 (p˜) /∂p˜ is positive and the denominator is negative, we infer that the function η1 (p˜)
increases in p˜.31
Now consider the other equilibrium condition. Let us denote the LHS of (10) as H (pˆ, p˜). The
condition H (pˆ, p˜) = 0 also defines an implicit relationship between pˆ and p˜. Let the function η2(p˜)
define such relationship. This function is represented in Figure 8 below. By the implicit function
theorem we have
∂η2 (p˜)
∂p˜
= −∂H/∂p˜
∂H/∂pˆ
. (29)
We note that H increases in pˆ. In fact,
∂H
∂pˆ
= (n− k) (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k−1
(
1− x¯k
)
+ (n− k) k
∫ x¯−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε > 0
Moreover, H decreases in p˜. In fact, for k < n− 1 we have
∂H
∂p˜
= −1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)
n−k−1 + (n− k) (n− k − 1)
∫ x¯−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 (ε+ pˆ)k dε
< −1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)
n−k−1 (1− x¯k)− (n− k) x¯kp˜n−k−1 < 0,
while for k = n−1 we get ∂H/∂p˜ = −2 < 0. As a result, we conclude that the function η2 is increasing
in p˜.
Therefore both η1 and η2 increase in p˜. To show that at least one pair of prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} exists that
satisfies the system of FOCs (11) and (10), we need to show that the functions η1 and η2 cross at least
once in the space [0; 1/2]× [0, pmk ]. As shown in Figure 8 we observe that η1 (0) > 0. To demonstrate
this, note that
G (pˆ, 0) =
1− x¯k
kx¯k−1
− pˆ+ 1
xk−1 (x− pˆ)n−k
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) εn−kdε.
Since G decreases in pˆ and since
G (0, 0) =
1− x¯k
kx¯k−1
+
1
xn−1
∫ x
0
εn−1dε > 0,
31When k = 2, equation (26) changes slightly. Therefore, we treat this case separately. If k = 2 then
g (pˆ, p˜) =
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜)n−2 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
(x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−2 x¯
and
∂g (pˆ, p˜)
∂pˆ
=
(n− 2) ∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜)n−2 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
(x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−1 x¯ +
2
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜)n−2 dε
(x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−2 x¯ −
x¯+ pˆ
x¯
.
Then equation (26) is
x¯ (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−1
[
∂g
∂pˆ
− 1
]
= (n− 2)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−2 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
+
2
n− 1 (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)
n − 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)− (2x¯+ pˆ) (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−1 (28)
The derivative of the RHS of (28) with respect to x¯ is negative
− (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−2
[
x¯
n2 − n− 2
n− 1 + pˆ
n+ 1
n− 1 −
2
n− 1 p˜
]
− 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 <
− (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−2
[
x¯
n2 − n− 2
n− 1 + pˆ
n+ 1
n− 1 −
2
n− 1 x¯
]
− 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 =
− (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−2
[
x¯
n2 − n− 4
n− 1 + pˆ
n+ 1
n− 1
]
− 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 < 0
Since this expression is negative, the same arguments can be used to conclude that ∂G/∂p˜ is positive also when k = 2,
which implies that η1 (p˜) increases in p˜.
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we conclude that η1 (0) > 0.
On the contrary, we now observe that η2 (0) < 0 (see Figure 8). This is because
H (pˆ, 0) = 1− (x¯− pˆ)n−k + (n− k)
∫ x¯−pˆ
0
εn−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k dε
is increasing in pˆ and H (0, 0) = 1− x¯n−k + (n− k) ∫ x¯0 εn−1dε > 0.
Secondly, as depicted in Figure 8, we show that η1 (1/2) < p
m
k < η2 (1/2) , which ensures that the
functions η1 and η2 cross at least once in the area [0; 1/2] × [0; pmk ] . To see that η2 (1/2) > pmk , we
show that H (pmk , 1/2) < 0 where
H
(
pmk ,
1
2
)
= 1− 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯
1
2
−
(
x¯− pmk +
1
2
)n−k
+ (n− k)
∫ x¯−pmk
0
(
ε+
1
2
)n−k−1
(ε+ pmk )
k dε.
Taking the derivative of H (pmk , 1/2) with respect to x¯ gives
−1− (n− k) x¯
n−k−1 + (n− k − 1) x¯n−k
2 (1− x¯)2 − (n− k)
(
x¯− pmk +
1
2
)n−k−1 (
1− x¯k
)
< 0,
so H (pmk , 1/2) is decreasing in x¯.
32 Setting x¯ equal to its lowest possible value, pmk , we get
H
(
pmk ,
1
2
)∣∣∣∣
x¯=pmk
= 1− 1
2n−k
− 1− (p
m
k )
n−k
2(1− pmk )
. (30)
This expression is decreasing in n. In fact, its derivative with respect to n can be written as
2n−k−1(pmk )
n−k ln pmk + (1− pmk ) ln 2
2n−k
(
1− pmk
) < 1
2n−k
(
1− pmk
) [pmk ln pmk + (1− pmk ) ln 2] < 0
The last inequatility follows from the fact that pmk ln p
m
k + (1− pmk ) ln 2 < 0.33 Since H (pmk , 1/2)|x¯=pmk
is decreasing in n, if we set n equal to its lowest possible value, k + 1, in (30) we obtain
H
(
pmk ,
1
2
)∣∣∣∣
x¯=pmk
≤ H
(
pmk ,
1
2
)∣∣∣∣
x¯=pmk ;n=k+1
= 1− 1
2k+1−k
− 1− (p
m
k )
k+1−k
2(1− pmk )
= 1− 1
2
− 1
2
= 0
Therefore, since H (pmk , 1/2) is decreasing in x¯, we conclude that H (p
m
k , 1/2) is always negative. And
because H is increasing in pˆ, we obtain the result that η2 (1/2) > p
m
k .
We now show that η1 (1/2) < p
m
k . Since G is decreasing in pˆ, it suffices to demonstrate that
G
(
pmk ,
1
2
)
=
1− xk
kxk−1
− pmk +
∫ x−pmk
0 (ε+ p
m
k )
k−2 (ε+ 12)n−k (ε+ kpmk ) dε(
x− pmk + 12
)n−k
xk−1
< 0.
Taking the derivative of G (pmk , 1/2) with respect to n gives(
x¯− pmk +
1
2
)n−k
x¯k−1
∂G
(
pmk ,
1
2
)
∂n
=
∫ x¯−pmk
0
(
ε+
1
2
)n−k
(ε+ pmk )
k−2 (ε+ kpmk ) ln
(
ε+ 1/2
x¯− pmk + 1/2
)
dε < 0
32The inequality follows from noting that the expression 1 − (n− k) x¯n−k−1 + (n− k − 1) x¯n−k decreases in x¯ and
therefore it is higher than when we set x¯ = 1, that is, 1−(n− k) x¯n−k−1+(n− k − 1) x¯n−k ≥ 1−(n−k)+(n− k − 1) = 0.
33Taking the derivative of pmk ln p
m
k + (1− pmk ) ln 2 with respect to k gives (∂pmk /∂k) (1− ln 2 + ln pmk ) . The sign of this
depends on the sign of 1 − ln 2 + ln pmk , which is monotonically increasing in k, first negative and then positive. As a
result, pmk ln p
m
k + ln 2 (1− pmk ) first decreases and then increases in k. At k = 2 it takes on a negative value while at
k →∞ it is equal to zero. Therefore it is always negative.
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Since G (pmk , 1/2) decreases in n, we can set n equal to its lowest value and write
G
(
pmk ,
1
2
)
< G
(
pmk ,
1
2
)∣∣∣∣
n=k+1
=
1
kx¯k−1
(
x¯− pmk + 12
)T (x¯)
where
T (x¯) =
(
x¯− pmk +
1
2
)(
1− x¯k − kx¯k−1pmk
)
+ k
∫ x¯−pmk
0
(ε+ pmk )
k−2
(
ε+
1
2
)
(ε+ kpmk ) dε
Note that
[
kx¯k−1 (x¯− pmk + 1/2)
]−1
> 0. Thus, G (pmk , 1/2)|n=k+1 is negative if T (x¯) < 0. T (x¯)
decreases in x¯ because ∂T (x¯) /∂x¯ = 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1pmk and this expression decreases in x. Therefore,
using x¯ = pmk , we can write
∂T (x¯)
∂x¯
<
∂T (x¯)
∂x¯
∣∣∣∣
x¯=pmk
= 1− (pmk )k − k (pmk )k−1 pmk = 0.
Since T (x¯) decreases in x¯, we conclude that T (x¯) < T (pmk ) = 0. As a result the functions η1 and η2
cross at least once in the area [0; 1/2]× [0; pmk ].
Claim 2 The pair of prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies (10) and (11) is unique.
Proof. To show this, it is enough to show that η1 increases in p˜ at a rate less than 1, while η2
does so at a rate greater than 1. From (25), since ∂G/∂pˆ < 0, we know that η1 increases in p˜ at a rate
less than 1 if and only if ∂G/∂pˆ+ ∂G/∂p˜ < 0. For the case k > 2, we can then write
xk−1 (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−k
[
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂p˜
+
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂pˆ
]
= (n− k)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
+ (k − 1)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε− (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k x¯k−2 [2x¯+ (k − 1) pˆ] . (31)
We now notice that the RHS of (31) decreases in x¯. In fact its derivative, after rearranging, is equal to
−(n−k)x¯k−1 (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k−1 < 0. Therefore, if (31) is negative when setting x¯ = pˆ, then it is always
negative. Checking this, we obtain:34
xk−1 (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−k
[
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂p˜
+
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂pˆ
]
< −p˜n−kpˆk−1(k + 1) < 0.
Similarly, using (29), since ∂H/∂pˆ > 0, we know that ∂η2/∂p˜ > 1 if and only if ∂H/∂pˆ+∂H/∂p˜ < 0.
For the case k < n− 1, using the expressions above, we then compute
∂H
∂p˜
+
∂H
∂pˆ
= −1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ + (n− k) (n− k − 1)
∫ x¯−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 (ε+ pˆ)k dε
− (n− k) (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−k−1 x¯k + (n− k) k
∫ x¯−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε (33)
34The same holds for the case when k = 2. We have
x (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−2
[
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂p˜
+
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂pˆ
]
= (n− 2)
∫ x−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−3 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
+
2
n− 1 (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)
n−1 − 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 − (2x¯+ pˆ) (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−2 (32)
After simplifying, the derivative of (32) with respect to x¯ is −x¯ (n− 2) (x¯− pˆ+ p˜)n−3 , which is clearly negative. Then
x (x− pˆ+ p˜)n−2
[
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂p˜
+
∂G (pˆ, p˜)
∂pˆ
]
< −3pˆp˜n−2 < 0
35
This expression decreases in x¯ because its partial derivative with respect to x¯, after rearranging, is
equal to
−1− (n− k) x¯
n−k−1 + (n− k − 1) x¯n−k
(1− x¯)2
and we have already shown above that the numerator of this expression is positive. Thus, using x¯ = pˆ
in (33) we can write35
∂H
∂p˜
+
∂H
∂pˆ
< −1− pˆ
n−k
1− pˆ − (n− k) p˜
n−k−1pˆk < 0.
The result then follows. 
Claim 3 The price of the merging stores is higher than the price of the non-merging ones, i.e., pˆ∗ > p˜∗.
Proof. Let p˜1 be the price at which the function η1 crosses the 45 degrees line, i.e., η1 (p˜1) = p˜1;
likewise, let p˜2 be such that η2 (p˜2) = p˜2 (p˜1 and p˜2 are represented in Figure 8). Given the properties
of η1 and η2, if we show that p˜1 > p˜2 then we can conclude that pˆ
∗ > p˜∗.
If we set p˜ = p˜1 in the FOC G (pˆ, p˜) = 0 we obtain:
p˜1 =
1− xk
kxk−1
+
∫ x−p˜1
0 (ε+ p˜1)
n−2 (ε+ kp˜1) dε
xn−1
(34)
Similarly, when p˜ = p˜2 the FOC H (pˆ, p˜) = 0 gives:
p˜2 = 1− x¯+ 1− x¯
1− x¯n−k (n− k)
∫ x¯−p˜2
0
(ε+ p˜2)
n−1 dε (35)
For a contradiction, suppose that p˜2 > p˜1. Then the difference between the RHS of (34) and the
RHS of (35) must be negative. Let us denote this difference as V and note that
V ≡
∫ x−p˜1
0 (ε+ p˜1)
n−2 (ε+ kp˜1) dε
xn−1
+
1 + (k − 1)xk − kx¯k−1
kxk−1
− 1− x¯
1− x¯n−k (n− k)
∫ x¯−p˜2
0
(ε+ p˜2)
n−1 dε
>
∫ x−p˜1
0 (ε+ p˜1)
n−1 dε
xn−1
+
1 + (k − 1)xk − kx¯k−1
kxk−1
− 1− x¯
1− x¯n−k (n− k)
∫ x¯−p˜2
0
(ε+ p˜2)
n−1 dε (36)
where the inequality follows from replacing ε+ kp˜1 by ε+ p˜1 in the first integral.
Since the second integral in (36) is equal to [xn − (p˜2)n]/n, the whole expression in (36) increases
in p˜2. Therefore, (36) must be higher than when we replace p˜2 by p˜1. That is, (36) is higher than
1
xn−1
∫ x−p˜1
0
(ε+ p˜1)
n−1 dε+
1− (k − 1)xk − kx¯k−1
kxk−1
− 1− x¯
1− x¯n−k (n− k)
∫ x¯−p˜1
0
(ε+ p˜1)
n−1 dε
=
x¯n − p˜n1
n (1− x¯n−k)
[
1− x¯n−k − (n− k) x¯n−1 (1− x¯)
x¯n−1
]
+
1 + (k − 1)xk − kx¯k−1
kxk−1
(37)
This last expression is positive, which establishes a contradiction.36 As a result, pˆ∗ > p˜∗.
The very last thing we check is whether “large” deviations are profitable. We start with the non-
merging firms. A non-merging firm may choose a price p˜ such that 1− x¯+ p˜∗ < p˜ < 1− x¯+ pˆ∗. Given
this, all consumers walk away from the deviant non-merging store and therefore its demand is made
35If k = n− 1 then ∂H
∂p˜
+ ∂H
∂pˆ
= −2 + (1− x¯n−1)+ (n− 1) ∫ x¯−pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)n−2 dε = −1− pˆn−1 < 0.
36The term in squared brackets is positive. To see this, note that it is concave in k. Therefore, if it is positive for
k = 2 and k = n− 1, then it is positive for all k. Setting k = 2 gives 1− xn−2 − (n− 2)xn−1(1− x), which decreases in
x since its derivative is −(n − 2)xn−3(1 − x)[(1 + x) + (n − 1)x] < 0. If we set x = 1 in the value for k = 2 gives zero.
Therefore it is positive for all x and k = 2. Setting now k = n− 1 gives (1− x)(xn−1) > 0.
36
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of consumers who return to it, either after visiting all non-merging stores or after visiting all stores in
the market. Then, the payoff function of the deviant is
pi = p˜
[∫ 1−p˜
x¯−pˆ∗
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε+
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
]
Taking the FOC gives:∫ 1−p˜
x¯−pˆ∗
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε+
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε− p˜ (1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 = 0
which can be rewritten as
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k − (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k + (n− k)
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
−(n− k)p˜ (1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 = 0 (38)
From (10), we obtain the relationship
(n− k)
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε =
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗ − 1 + (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
and use it in (38) to get
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k − 1 + 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗ − p˜ (1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (n− k) = 0
or
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1
[
1 + p˜∗ − (n− k + 1) p˜− 1
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1
(
1− 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗
)]
= 0. (39)
We now argue that the LHS of (39) is always negative. Denote the term in squared brackets by
φ (p˜, p˜∗) . Taking its derivative with respecto to p˜ gives
∂φ
∂p˜
= − (n− k + 1)− n− k − 1
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k
(
1− 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗
)
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which is negative because
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗ − 1 = − (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k + (n− k)
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
< − (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k + x¯k (n− k)
∫ x¯−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε
= (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
(
x¯k − 1
)
− x¯kp˜∗ < 0
Since φ (p˜, p˜∗) decreases in p˜ and
φ (p˜, p˜∗) < φ (p˜∗, p˜∗) = 1 + p˜∗ − (n− k + 1) p˜∗ −
(
1− 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗
)
< 1− (n− k) p˜∗ − (1− (n− k) p˜∗) = 0,
we conclude that the LHS of (39) is always negative, which implies that the profit function is decreasing
in p˜. As a result, the deviation is not profitable.
A non-merging firm may also deviate to a price p˜ such that 1− x¯+ pˆ∗ < p˜ < 1/2, in which case its
payoff would be
pi = p˜
∫ 1
p˜
(ε− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε− p˜+ pˆ∗)k dε = p˜
∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε.
Taking the FOC and rewriting it gives∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k dε− p˜ = 0 (40)
The integrand of this expression increases in k. In fact its derivative is equal to
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1
(ε+ pˆ∗)k
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k ln
(ε+ pˆ∗) (1− p˜+ p˜∗)
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗) (ε+ p˜∗) > 0,
where the inequality follows from the observation that
(ε+ pˆ∗) (1− p˜+ p˜∗)
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗) (ε+ p˜∗) >
(ε+ pˆ∗) (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗) (ε+ pˆ∗) = 1
Hence, we can write∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k dε− p˜ ≤
∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−n+1−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)n−1
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−n+1−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)n−1dε− p˜
=
∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)n−1
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗)n−1dε− p˜ <
∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−1
(1− p˜+ p˜)n−1dε− p˜ =
1
n
(1− p˜n − np˜) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that p˜ > pˆ∗ and pˆ∗ > p∗ (see the proof of Proposition
2) and the expression 1− p˜n−np˜ decreases in p˜ so 1− p˜n−np˜ < 1− p∗n−np∗ ≤ 0 (see the FOC (4)).
We then conclude that the LHS of (40) is negative and therefore the deviation is not profitable either.
We finish by checking that the merged entity does not find it profitable to deviate to a price
pˆ > 1− x¯+ pˆ∗. In such a case, its payoff would be
pi = pˆ
∫ 1
pˆ
(ε− pˆ+ p˜∗)n−k kεk−1dε = pˆ
∫ 1−pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k k (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε
38
and the corresponding FOC:∫ 1−pˆ
0 (ε+ p˜
∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) dε
(1− pˆ+ p˜∗)n−k − pˆ = 0. (41)
We note that this FOC is identical to (19) when s → 0. We already proved that (41) decreases in pˆ.
Therefore, the deviating profits are highest when pˆ = 1 − x¯ + pˆ∗, which implies that the deviation is
not profitable because pi∗ > pi|pˆ=1−x¯+pˆ∗ .
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1 pˆ∗ > p˜∗. Let us now show that p˜∗ > p∗.
(1) For a contradiction, assume that p˜∗ < p∗ when x¯ → 1. Denote the quantity sold by a non-
merged firm by q˜∗, that sold by all the merging firms together by qˆ∗ and the aggregate quantity sold
in the market by all firms by Q. We note that Q = 1− pˆ∗ kp˜∗n−k.37 Using the FOCs we can write that
Y (p˜∗, pˆ∗) ≡ Q− (n− k)q˜∗ − qˆ∗ = 0
where
(n− k)q˜∗ = 1− x
n−k
1− x p˜
∗
qˆ∗ = kpˆ∗xk−1 (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k − k (k − 1) pˆ∗
∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε.
We now argue that Y (p˜∗, pˆ∗) is decreasing in p˜∗. This is because ∂Q/∂p˜∗ < 0, ∂q˜∗/∂p˜∗ > 0 and
1
k(n− k)pˆ∗
∂qˆ∗
∂p˜∗
= xk−1 (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k−1 − (k − 1)
∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε
> xk−1 (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k−1 − (k − 1) (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k−1
∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 dε
= (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k−1 pˆ∗ k−1 > 0
Next, since Y is decreasing in p˜∗ and by assumption p˜∗ < p∗ we must have Y (p∗, pˆ∗) < 0. In other
words, it must be the case that
lim
x→1
Y (p∗, pˆ∗) = 1− pˆ∗ kp∗n−k − (n− k) p∗ − kpˆ∗ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
+ k (k − 1) pˆ∗
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε < 0 (42)
Now we invoke the FOC of the merged entity, denoted above by G (pˆ∗, p˜∗). The function G (pˆ∗, p˜∗)
was shown to be increasing in p˜∗ so when p˜∗ < p∗ we must have G (pˆ∗, p∗) > G (pˆ∗, p˜∗) = 0. Therefore:
lim
x¯→1
G (pˆ∗, p∗) = −pˆ∗ + (k − 1)
(1− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k pˆ
∗
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε
+
1
(1− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε
must be positive, which implies that it must be the case that
−pˆ∗ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k+(k − 1) pˆ∗
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε > −
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε.
Using this inequality in (42), we get that
lim
x→1
Y (p∗, pˆ∗) > 1− pˆ∗kp∗n−k − (n− k) p∗ − k
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε (43)
37A consumer does not buy at all when the match value drawn at every firm is lower than its corresponding price.
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This last expression is increasing in pˆ∗. This is because the sign of its derivative with respect to pˆ∗ is
the same as the sign of the following expression
− pˆ∗ k−1p∗n−k − (k − 1)
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε+ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
> −pˆ∗ k−1p∗n−k − (k − 1) (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
∫ 1−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 dε+ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
= −pˆ∗k−1p∗n−k + (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k pˆ∗k−1 > 0
We now argue that pˆ∗ ≥ p∗. To show this, we first invoke the result in Proposition 3 of Zhou (2009)
that the equilibrium price of firms visited last is higher than p∗. In our model, in addition to the
search-order effect of Zhou, the firms visited last internalize the pricing externalities they confer on
one another and this leads the firms to raise further their prices. As a result, here it must also be the
case that pˆ∗ ≥ p∗. Given this, (43) is greater than after setting pˆ∗ = p∗, that is, limx→1 Y (p∗, pˆ∗) is
larger than
1− (p∗)n − (n− k) p∗ − k
[
1
n
− 1
n
(p∗)n
]
= np∗ − (n− k) p∗ − kp∗ = 0,
where for the last equality we have used the FOC of a typical firm in the pre-merger market (when
x¯ → 1 the FOC of a firm in a pre-merger market becomes 1 − np∗ − (p∗)n = 0). Consequently, if
p˜∗ > p∗ then we have limx→1 Y (p∗, pˆ∗) > 0, which establishes a contradiction.
(2) Let us take the limit of the LHS of (11) and (10) when x¯ → pmk and let p˜l ≡ limx¯→pmk p˜∗ and
pmk ≡ limx¯→pmk pˆ∗. Then we get the following expressions
(p˜l)
n−k
[
1− (k + 1) (pmk )k
]
= 0
(1− pmk )
(
1− (p˜l)n−k
)
− p˜l
[
1− (pmk )n−k
]
= 0. (44)
The first equation is indeed zero given the definition of pmk and the second equation therefore gives the
value of p˜∗ when x¯→ pmk . We note that p˜l < pm = 1/2 because, as shown in the proof of proposition
1, H (pmk , 1/2) ≤ 0.
Let pl ≡ limx¯→pmk p∗. We now argue that p˜l > pl. To show this, we take the limit when x¯→ pmk of
the FOC that determines pl. This gives (1− pmk ) (1− (pl)n)− pl [1− (pmk )n] = 0. The solution of this
equation, pl, decreases in n. Comparing this equation with (44), since n − k < n, it is immediately
clear that p˜l > pl.
(3) If n = 3 then the FOC of a merging firm may be rearranged as follows
pˆ∗3 − pˆ∗x¯2 − p˜∗ (3pˆ∗2 − 1) = x¯3
3
− pˆ
∗3
3
− x¯+ pˆ∗. (45)
The FOC of a non-merging firm gives us the relation x¯3/3 − pˆ∗3/3 − x¯ + pˆ∗ = 2p˜∗ − 1. Using this
expression in (45) we have pˆ∗3 − pˆ∗x¯2 − 3p˜∗pˆ∗2 − p˜∗ + 1 = 0, or
p˜∗ =
1 + pˆ∗3 − pˆ∗x¯2
1 + 3pˆ∗2
.
From the FOC in the pre-merger market we know that
p∗ =
1− p∗3
1 + x¯+ x¯2
.
Since, by strategic complementarity, p˜∗ increases in pˆ∗ and since pˆ∗ > p∗, the difference p˜∗ − p∗ is
greater than when we replace pˆ∗ by p∗. Therefore
p˜∗ − p∗ = 1 + pˆ
∗3 − pˆ∗x¯2
1 + 3pˆ∗2
− 1− p
∗3
1 + x¯+ x¯2
>
1 + p∗3 − p∗x¯2
1 + 3p∗2
− 1− p
∗3
1 + x¯+ x¯2
(46)
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The RHS of this expression is concave in x¯ because its second derivative with respect to x¯ is negative:
− 2p
∗
1 + 3p∗2
− 6
(
1− p∗3) x¯(1 + x¯)
(1 + x¯+ x¯2)3
< 0
Hence, if the RHS of (46) is positive with the highest and the lowest possible values of x¯ then it is
positive for all possible x¯ values. Setting x¯ = 1 in the RHS of (46) gives
2− 3p∗ − 3p∗2 + 4p∗3 + 3p∗5
3 (1 + 3p∗2)
. (47)
which, as shown in Figure 9, is always positive for all p∗ ∈ [0, 1/2]. Setting x¯ = p∗ in (46) gives
Figure 9: Plot of expression 47
p
(
1− 3p∗ + 3p∗2)
1 + 3p∗2
> 0.
Thus, p˜∗ > p∗. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (1) To prove this we set k = 2 in the profits difference pˆi∗/k − pi∗ and
study its sign when x→ pm2 (= 1/
√
3). For the profit of a merging firm we have
lim
x→1/√3
pˆi∗
2
=
(p˜l)
n−2
3
√
3
where, as in the proof of Proposition 2, p˜l ≡ limx→pmk p˜∗. We have shown above that p˜l < pm = 1/2.
Therefore,
lim
x→1/√3
pˆi∗
2
<
(pm)n−2
3
√
3
which implies that
lim
x→1/√3
[
pˆi∗
2
− pi∗
]
<
(1/2)n−2
3
√
3
− (pl)
2 [1− (pm2 )n]
n(1− pm2 )
(48)
where, again as in the proof of Proposition 2, pl ≡ limx→pmk p∗. If we demonstrate that (48) is negative,
then the result follows. For this we need that
pl >
√
n(1− 3−1/2)(1/2)n−2
3
√
3(1− 3−n/2) (49)
To show that (49) indeed holds, we now invoke the FOC in the pre-merger market; when x → 1/√3
the FOC writes
1− (pl)n − pl 1− 3
−n/2
1− 3−1/2 = 0. (50)
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Now, using (50), if we replace pl by
[
n(1−3−1/2)
2n−23
√
3(1−3−n/2)
] 1
2
in this expression we get
1−
[
n(1− 3−1/2)
2n−23
√
3(1− 3−n/2)
]n
2
−
√
n(1− 3−1/2)
2n−23
√
3(1− 3−n/2)
(
1− 3−n/2)
1− 3−1/2 . (51)
This last expression, as shown in Figure 10, is always positive for n ≥ 3.
Figure 10: Plot of expression (51).
Since (50) is decreasing in pl, then (49) must hold.
(2) Using the definition of pmk , we have that 1− (pmk )k = k(pmk )k. Therefore we can write
lim
x¯→pmk ;n→∞
[
pˆi∗
k
− pi∗
]
= lim
n→∞
[
pmk (p˜l)
n−k(1− (pmk )k)−
(pl)
2 (1− (pmk )n)
n
(
1− pmk
) ]
< lim
n→∞
[
(pmk )
k+1
2n−k
− (pl)
2 (1− (pmk )n)
n
(
1− pmk
) ]
where the inequality follows from the fact that p˜l < p
m = 1/2. Note that 1 − (pmk )n > 1 − (pmk )k =
k (pmk )
k. Thus,
lim
n→∞
[
(pmk )
k+1
2n−k
− (pl)
2 (1− (pmk )n)
n
(
1− pmk
) ] < (pmk )k
1− pmk
lim
n→∞
[
pmk (1− pmk )
2n−k
− (pl)
2k
n
]
= 0,
which shows that for any k, merging is not profitable whenever search costs and the number of
competitors is sufficiently high.
(3) To prove this, we show that limx¯→1 [pˆi∗ − kpi∗] > 0. Notice that
lim
x¯→1
pˆi∗ = pˆ∗1k
∫ 1−pˆ∗1
0
(ε+ p˜∗1)
n−k (ε+ pˆ∗1)
k−1 dε (52)
where pˆ∗1 ≡ limx¯→1 pˆ∗ and p˜∗1 ≡ limx¯→1 p˜∗1. Since pˆ∗1 solves the FOC (11), we can replace pˆ∗1 in (52)
and write
lim
x¯→1
pˆi∗ > p˜∗1k
∫ 1−p˜∗1
0
(ε+ p˜∗1)
n−k (ε+ p˜∗1)
k−1 dε =
kp˜∗1
n
(1− p˜∗n1 ) .
We note note that the polynomial y(1 − yn) is increasing in y for all y ≤ (n+ 1)−1/n. Therefore,
because p˜∗1 > p∗1 we can write that limx¯→1 pˆi∗ >
kp∗1
n (1− p∗n1 ) = k limx¯→1 pi∗, where p∗1 ≡ limx¯→1 p∗1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. We first claim that
there is a pair of prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies the FOCs (19) and (20) and then argue that such a pair
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of prices is unique. After this, we show that the putative order of search is optimal when the search
cost is sufficiently large. Finally, we check whether “large” deviations are profitable.
Let G(pˆ∗, p˜∗) and H(pˆ∗, p˜∗) denote the LHS of the FOCs (19) and (20), respectively. In what
follows, we drop the ”∗” super-indexes to shorten the expressions.
Claim 4 There is a pair of prices pˆ and p˜ that satisfy the first-order conditions G(pˆ, p˜) = 0 and
H(pˆ, p˜) = 0.
Proof. The function G is differentiable and takes on real values for all (pˆ, p˜) ∈ [0, pmk ] × [0, pm].
Therefore, the FOC G (p˜, pˆ) = 0 defines an implicit relation between pˆ and p˜. Let us denote such
relationship by p˜ = υ1(pˆ). We now argue that υ1 is increasing. By the implicit function theorem
∂υ1
∂pˆ
=
−∂G/∂pˆ
∂G/∂p˜
(53)
We next note that G is decreasing in pˆ and increasing in p˜. To see this, compute first
∂G
∂pˆ
=
[
− (k − 1) (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜+ (k + 1) pˆ)− (k + 1) (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−1
+ k (k − 1)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−3 (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
]
= −k (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2 (2x− 2p˜+ (k + 1) pˆ)
+ k (k − 1)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−3 (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
Note next that ∂G/∂pˆ decreases in x¯. This is because
1
k
∂2G
∂x∂pˆ
= − (k − 2) (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−3 (2x− 2p˜+ (k + 1) pˆ)− 2 (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2
+ (k − 1)xn−k (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−3 (2x− 2p˜+ kpˆ)
= −(k − 1)(x− p˜+ pˆ)k−3(2x− 2p˜+ kpˆ)
(
1− xn−k
)
< 0
We know that x ≥ p˜. If we evaluate ∂G/∂pˆ at x = p˜ we obtain ∂G/∂pˆ = −k (k + 1) pˆk−1 < 0. Since
∂G/∂pˆ decreases in x¯, then we conclude ∂G/∂pˆ is negative for all x.
Compute now
∂G
∂p˜
= (k − 1) (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜+ (k + 1) pˆ) + (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−1
+ k (n− k)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) dε
− kxn−k (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜+ kpˆ)
= k (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜+ kpˆ)
(
1− xn−k
)
+ k (n− k)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) dε > 0
As a consequence, υ1 is increasing in pˆ.
We now observe that the solution of the equation G(pˆ, p˜) = 0 when pˆ = 0 is negative. We establish
this by contradiction. Suppose that the solution to G(0, p˜) = 0 is some non-negative number. If this
is so, since we know G increases in p˜, it should be the case that G(0, 0) < 0. However,
G(0, 0) = 1− xk + k
∫ x
0
εn−1 > 0,
43
which leads to a contradiction. Summarizing, we have shown that the implicit function υ1, defined on
[0, pmk ], starts taking negative values and is increasing.
Consider now the second FOC H(pˆ, p˜) = 0 and rewrite it as
1− xn−k
(n− k) (1− x) (1− x− p˜) +
1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε = 0
Let us denote the LHS of this expression by L(pˆ, p˜). The equation L(pˆ, p˜) = 0 defines an implicit
relationship between pˆ and p˜, which we denote p˜ = υ2(pˆ). We show next υ2 is also increasing. By the
implicit function theorem we have
∂υ2
∂pˆ
=
−∂L/∂pˆ
∂L/∂p˜
,
We note that L is increasing in pˆ and decreasing in p˜. The first observation comes from
∂L
∂pˆ
=
k
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k+1
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (x− p˜− ε) dε > 0.
For the second, we compute
∂L
∂p˜
= − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
k
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k+1
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
+
n− k − 1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1 (54)
It is difficult to evaluate the sign of this derivative on inspection. To ease the evaluation, consider first
the term in the second line of this derivative. We note that
n− k − 1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1
< (n− k − 1)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1 = −p˜n−k−1 < 0 (55)
Consider next the first term of (54) and note that
k
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k+1
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε− 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x)
<
kxn−k−1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k+1
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k dε− 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x)
=
kx¯n−k−1
k + 1
− kx¯
n−k−1pˆk+1
(k + 1) (x− p˜+ pˆ)k+1 −
1− xn−k
(n− k) (1− x)
<
kx¯n−k−1
k + 1
− 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) =
1
1− x¯
[
kx¯n−k−1 (1− x¯)
k + 1
− 1− x¯
n−k
n− k
]
(56)
We now argue that the term in square brackets in the last line of (56) is negative for all x¯. To see
this, we first observe that it increases in x¯. In fact, taking the derivative w.r.t. x¯ we get
k + 1
x¯n−k−2
∂
∂x¯
[
kx¯n−k−1 (1− x¯)
k + 1
− 1− x¯
n−k
n− k
]
= k (n− k − 1)− k (n− k) x¯
+ (k + 1)x¯ = −k (k + 1) + (k + 1) x¯+ k2x¯+ nk (1− x¯)
≥ −k (k + 1) + (k + 1) x¯+ k2x¯+ (k + 1) k (1− x¯) = x¯ > 0
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Since for the highest possible x¯ we have
lim
x¯→1
kx¯n−k−1 (1− x¯)
k + 1
− 1− x¯
n−k
n− k = 0
we conclude that (56) is negative. This in turn implies that L decreases in p˜. Since L is increasing in
pˆ and decreasing in p˜, the function υ2, defined implicitly by the first order condition H(pˆ, p˜) = 0, is
also increasing in pˆ.
We finally observe that the solution to L(pˆ, p˜) = 0 when pˆ = 0 must be a positive number. By
contradiction, suppose that the solution to L(0, p˜) = 0 is some negative number. If this is so, since we
know L decreases in p˜, it should be the case that L(0, 0) < 0. However,
L(0, 0) =
1− xn−k
n− k +
1
xk
∫ x−p˜
0
εn−1dε > 0,
which constitutes a contradiction. Summarizing, we have now shown that the implicit function υ2
defined on [0, pmk ] starts taking positive values and is increasing.
To show that υ1 and υ2 cross at least once, we now prove that υ1 (p
m
k ) = x > υ2 (p
m
k ) (since both
are increasing in p˜ and we know that υ1(0) < 0 < υ2(0)). Setting pˆ = p
m
k in the FOC for the merged
entity gives
G (pmk , p˜) = 1− (x− p˜+ pmk )k−1 (x− p˜+ (k + 1) pmk )
+ k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ pmk )
k−2 (ε+ kpmk ) dε = 0
which solution is p˜ = x since G (pmk , x) = 1− (k + 1) (pmk )k = 0 by definition of pmk .
Likewise setting pˆ = pmk in the FOC for the non-merging firm gives
L (pmk , p˜) =
1− xn−k
(n− k) (1− x) (1− x− p˜)
+
1(
x− p˜+ pmk
)k ∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pmk )
k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε = 0
Since L (pmk , x) = (1 − xn−k) (1− 2x) / (n− k) (1− x) ≤ 0 and we know that L decreases in p˜, it is
clear that the solution to L (pmk , p˜) = 0 must be some p˜ < x.
To complete the proof of existence, it remains to be shown that at the point(s) at which υ1 and
υ2 cross we have p˜ ≤ pm = 1/2. For this, it suffices to show that L (pmk , 1/2) < 0 because since L
decreases in p˜, this means that the solution to L (pmk , p˜) = 0 must be some p˜ < 1/2. In fact, setting
p˜ = 1/2, we get
L (pmk , 1/2) =
1− xn−k
(n− k) (1− x)
(
1
2
− x
)
+
1(
x− 12 + pmk
)k ∫ x− 12
0
(ε+ pmk )
k
(
ε+
1
2
)n−k−1
dε. (57)
We now note that L (pmk , 1/2) decreases in x. To see this, compute
∂L
(
pmk ,
1
2
)
∂x¯
= −1 + (n− k − 1)x
n−k − (n− k)xn−k−1
2(n− k)(1− x)2
− k(
x− 12 + pmk
)k+1 ∫ x−1/2
0
(ε+ pmk )
k
(
ε+
1
2
)n−k−1
dε (58)
and notice that 1+(n−k−1)xn−k−(n−k)xn−k−1 > 0 for all x (since it decreases in x and equals zero
when x = 1). Therefore, if L (pmk , 1/2) ≤ 0 for the lowest value of x, then it is negative everywhere. In
fact, setting x = 1/2 in (57) yields L (pmk , 1/2) = 0. To summarize, we have now shown that υ1 and
υ2 cross at least once on [0, p
m
k ]× [0, pm] so a candidate equilibrium exists. 
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Claim 5 The pair of prices {pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies (19) and (20) is unique.
Proof. We start by noting that υ1 is increasing in pˆ at a rate greater than 1. Using the derivations
above, this follows from the following remarks. First, note that
1
k
(
−∂G
∂pˆ
− ∂G
∂p˜
)
= (x− p˜+ pˆ)k−2
(
(x− p˜+ pˆ) + xn−k(x− p˜+ kpˆ)
)
− (k − 1)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k(ε+ pˆ)k−3(2ε+ kpˆ)dε
− (n− k)
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1(ε+ pˆ)k−2(ε+ kpˆ)dε. (59)
Observe now that this expression is increasing in x, as its derivative with respect to x equals (k −
1)(x − p˜ + pˆ)k−2 (1− xn−1) ≥ 0. Therefore, if (59) is positive when x takes on its lowest value, then
it is positive everywhere. Setting x = p˜ in the RHS of (59) gives pˆk−2
(
pˆ+ kp˜n−kpˆ
)
> 0, which proves
that υ1 increases with slope greater than 1.
We continue by noting that the rate at which υ2 increases is lower than 1. Using the derivations
above, since ∂L/∂p˜ < 0, we need to show that
∂L
∂pˆ
+
∂L
∂p˜
= − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
k
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
+
n− k − 1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1 (60)
is negative. Now notice that the last line of this expression is negative (from (55)). Moreover, regarding
the first line of (60) we have
− 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
k
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
< − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
kxn−k−1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
∫ x−p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε
= − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
xn−k−1
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k
[
(x− p˜+ pˆ)k − pˆk
]
< − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) + x
n−k−1 = −1 + (n− k − 1) x¯
n−k − (n− k) x¯n−k−1
(n− k) (1− x¯) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the remarks after equation (58). This implies that υ2 increases
at a rate less than 1. This, together with the arguments before shows that there exists a unique
candidate equilibrium. 
It remains to be shown that x− pˆ∗ > x− p˜∗ and pˆ∗ > p˜∗. Consider the case in which s is sufficiently
large. Since we assume that k ≤ 10, s→ 1/8 (x¯→ 1/2) suffices. It takes a few steps to check that the
solution to the FOCs (19) and (20) is p˜∗ = pm = 1/2 = x¯ and pˆ∗ = pkm = (1 + k)−1/k when s → 1/8;
therefore pˆ∗ > p˜∗. Given that x − p˜∗ = 0 when s → 1/8, proving that x − pˆ∗ > x − p˜∗ boils down to
showing that x− pˆ∗ > 0. We know x satisfies ∫ 1x k(ε− x)εk−1dε− s = 0, or
k(1− x)− x(1− xk)
k + 1
− s = 0. (61)
Equation (61) can be rewritten as
x =
k + x
k+1
k + 1
− s
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Figure 11: Payoff of the (deviating) merged entity
Deducting pˆ∗ on both sides of this equality gives
x− pˆ∗ = k + x
k+1
k + 1
− pˆ∗ − s. (62)
When s→ 1/8, pˆ∗ = (1 + k)−1/k. As a result, when s→ 1/8, equation (62) writes
x− pkm =
k + x
k+1
k + 1
− 1
(1 + k)
1
k
− 1
8
(63)
Note now that the RHS of (63) increases in x. Therefore using the lowest admissible value for x, we
can write
x− pkm >
k + (12)
k+1
k + 1
− 1
(1 + k)
1
k
− 1
8
> 0
for all k ≤ n− 1.
Finally, we check that “large” deviations are not profitable. We start with deviations by the merged
entity. Consider that the merged entity deviates by charging a price pˆ > 1− x¯+ p˜∗. In such a case, its
payoff would be
pi = kpˆ
∫ 1
pˆ
(ε− pˆ+ p˜∗)n−k εk−1kdε.
An analytical proof that this deviation is not profitable has proven to be very difficult so we proceed
by checking it numerically. We proceed as follows. For a given search cost (or x¯) we compute the
putative equilibrium pair of prices {p̂∗, p˜∗}. Then we plot the payoff function of the merged entity for
all possible (deviation) prices. As shown in Figure 11 for two different levels of the search cost and
n = 3, k = 2, the putative equilibrium is not destabilized by large deviations. For other combinations
of parameters, the shape of the payoff function is similar.
Consider now ‘large’ deviations by a non-merging firm, i.e. deviations to prices p˜ > 1− x¯+ p˜∗. In
that case, the payoff to the deviant would be
pi = p˜
∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε.
Taking the FOC gives∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε− p˜ (1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k = 0,
which we rewrite as ∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k dε− p˜ = 0 (64)
The LHS of (64) decreases in p˜. In fact, its derivative is
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(n− k − 1) (1− p˜+ p˜∗) + k (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k+1
∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε− 2 < 0,
where the inequality follows from
[(n− k − 1) (1− p˜+ pˆ∗) + k (1− p˜+ p˜∗)] ∫ 1−p˜0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k+1 =
(n− k − 1) ∫ 1−p˜0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k +
k
∫ 1−p˜
0 (ε+ p˜
∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k+1 <
(n− k − 1) ∫ 1−p˜0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k +
k
∫ 1−p˜
0 (ε+ pˆ
∗)k dε
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k+1 =
n− k − 1
n− k
[
1− (p˜
∗)n−k
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k
]
+
k
k + 1
[
1− (pˆ
∗)k+1
(1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k+1
]
< 2
Then, (64) is lower than when we set p˜ = 1− x¯+ p˜∗, that is∫ 1−p˜
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k
(1− p˜+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (1− p˜+ pˆ∗)k dε− p˜ <
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k
x¯n−k−1 (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k dε− (1− x¯+ p˜
∗) .
Using the FOC (20), this last expression is equal to
− 1
x¯n−k−1
1− x¯n−k
(n− k) (1− x¯) (1− x¯− p˜
∗)− (1− x¯+ p˜∗) = −1− x¯− p˜
∗
1− x¯
∫ 1
x¯
εn−k−1
x¯n−k−1
dε− (1− x¯+ p˜∗)
This expression increases in k. Therefore, it is lower than when we set k = n− 1, which gives
−1− x¯− p˜
∗
1− x¯
∫ 1
x¯
dε− (1− x¯+ p˜∗) = −2(1− x¯) ≤ 0
Hence, there the deviation is not profitable. 
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) We first show that the merging stores increase their profits after
the merger. The difference between the profit per product of the merged entity, pˆi/k, and the typical
pre-merger profit of a firm, pi∗, equals:
pˆi
k
− pi∗ = pˆ
∗
k
[
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k + k
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1(ε+ p˜∗)n−kdε
]
− p
∗
n
(1− p∗n)
Since pˆ∗ is an equilibrium price, then, given the non-merging firm’s price, pˆi (pˆ∗) is greater than
pˆi (pˆ) for any pˆ 6= pˆ∗. Therefore, replacing pˆ∗ by p˜∗ gives
pˆi
k
− pi∗ > p˜∗
[
1− xk
k
+
1
n
(xn − p˜∗n)
]
− p
∗
n
(1− p∗n) (65)
We now note that 1−x
k
k =
∫ 1
x ε
k−1dε and is decreasing in k. Therefore, the RHS of (65) is greater
than when we set k = n− 1, which gives
p˜∗
[
1− xn−1
n− 1 +
1
n
(xn − p˜∗n)
]
− p
∗
n
(1− p∗n)
=
p˜∗
n (n− 1)
[
n(1− x¯n−1) + (n− 1) (x¯n − p˜∗n)]− p∗
n
(1− p∗n) . (66)
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Observe next that this expression is decreasing in x since its derivative with respect to x is equal to
−xn−2n(n− 1)(1− x) < 0. Therefore, (66) is larger than when we set x = 1, which gives
p˜∗
n (n− 1) (n− 1− (n− 1) p˜
∗n)− p
∗
n
(1− p∗n) = p˜
∗
n
(1− p˜∗n)− p
∗
n
(1− p∗n) .
Finally, note that the expression p˜∗ (1− p˜∗n) is increasing in p˜∗ because its derivative with respect
to p˜∗ is equal to 1− (n+ 1) p˜∗n > 0. We then conclude that pˆi/k − pi∗ > 0 if p˜∗ > p∗. But, as argued
in the proof of Proposition 2, the last inequality is true because p˜∗ is the price of the firms that are
visited last.
(ii) It has been shown in the proof of Proposition 4 that when search cost is large pˆ∗ → pmk and
p˜∗ → 12 . Therefore, we have:
lim
x¯→1/2
[
pˆi∗
k
− p˜i∗
]
= lim
x¯→1/2
[
pˆ∗
k
(
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k + k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε
)
− p˜∗
(
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
n− k
(
1− x¯n−k
)
+
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
)]
=
1
k
pmk
(
1− (pmk )k
)
− 1
2 (n− k)(p
m
k )
k
(
1− 1
2n−k
)
=
1
k
pmk
(
1− (pmk )k
)
− (p
m
k )
k
2
∫ 1
1/2
εn−k−1dε
This expression is increasing in n because its derivative with respect to n equals
−(p
m
k )
k
2
∫ 1
1/2
εn−k−1 ln εdε > 0
Then
lim
x¯→1/2
[
pˆi∗
k
− p˜i∗
]
≥ p
m
k
k
(
1− (pmk )k
)
− 1
2
(pmk )
k
k + 1− k
(
1− 2k−k−1
)
=
pmk
k + 1
− (p
m
k )
k
2
(
1− 1
2
)
=
pmk
k + 1
− 1
4 (k + 1)
=
1
4 (k + 1)
[4pmk − 1] > 0
where the first inequality follows form replacing n by k + 1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) We first note that the equilibrium of Proposition 4 has pˆ∗ > p˜∗
when the search cost is sufficiently high. The difference between post- and pre-merger total industry
profits is ∆Π ≡ pˆi∗ + (n− k)p˜i∗ − npi∗. Using the expressions for profits above, we have
∆Π = pˆ∗
(
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k + k
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε
)
+
p˜∗
(
(x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
(
1− xn−k
)
+ (n− k)
∫ x−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
)
− p∗ (1− p∗n)
Note now that this expression is clearly increasing in pˆ∗ (the derivative of the first line, by the FOC,
is zero and that of the second line is positive). Hence,
∆Π > ∆Π|pˆ∗=p˜∗ = p˜∗ (1− p˜∗n)− p∗ (1− p∗n) > 0 (67)
as shown in the proof of Proposition 5.
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(ii) In the pre-merger market, consumer surplus is given by
CS∗ =
1− xn
1− x
∫ 1
x
(ε− p∗) dε+ n
∫ x
p∗
εn−1 (ε− p∗) dε− 1− x¯
n
1− x¯ s
=
1− xn
1− x
∫ 1
x
(ε− p∗) dε+ n
∫ x
p∗
εn−1 (ε− p∗) dε− (1− x¯
n) (1− x¯)
2
In the post-merger market, consumer surplus is given by CS = ĈS + C˜S − Sc where ĈS, C˜S and
Sc are given by (21), (22) and (23), respectively.
When s→ 1/8, x→ 1/2, p∗ → 1/2 and pˆ∗ → pmk . Then, we can establish the comparison
lim
s→1/8
[
ĈS + C˜S − Sc− CS∗
]
=
∫ 1
pmk
k (ε− pmk ) εk−1dε−
1
8
> 0
The proof is now complete. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The first order conditions of the merger and a non-merged firm are
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 (x¯− p˜∗ + (k + 1) pˆ∗) + k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (68)
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
n− k
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ (1− x¯− p˜
∗) +
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (69)
(a) We now prove that when search cost is sufficiently high then pˆ∗ > p˜∗ and therefore consumer
expectations are violated. We start by noting that, because the price of the non-merging firms is
less than or equal to 1/2 < pmk for all x¯ ∈ [pmk ; 1], the integral in (68) is positive. As a result, for
an equilibrium to exist, the rest of the LHS of (68), 1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k − k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k pˆ∗, must be
negative. Note that this expression decreases in pˆ∗. Then, it must be higher than when we set pˆ∗ = p˜∗
because pˆ∗ < p˜∗ by assumption. That is, it must be the case that
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k − k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k pˆ∗ > 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1p˜∗ (70)
We now note that when x¯→ pmk the expression 1−x¯k−kx¯k−1pmk is equal to zero. Since p˜∗ ≤ 1/2 < pmk ,
it is clear that 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1pmk > 0 when x¯→ pmk . But this constitutes a contradiction because then
the LHS of (68) cannot be negative. As a result, there is no such pair of prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ that satisfy
(68) and (69) when x¯→ pmk and pˆ∗ < p˜∗.
(b) We prove now that when search cost goes to zero again we obtain pˆ∗ > p˜∗, which violates
consumer expectations. To show this we use again the equality
Y (p˜∗, pˆ∗) ≡ Q− qˆ∗ − (n− k) q˜∗ = 0
where Q = 1 − pˆ∗kp˜∗n−k denotes the aggregate quantity sold in the market and qˆ∗ and q˜∗ denote
the equilibrium quantities of the merged entity and the non-merging firms. From the FOCs, these
quantities are given by
qˆ∗ = k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 pˆ∗ − k (k − 1) pˆ∗
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
q˜∗ =
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1
n− k
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ p˜
∗
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The partial derivative of Y with respect to pˆ∗ is negative because q˜∗ increases with pˆ∗ and the
derivative of qˆ∗ with respect to pˆ∗ is positive:
∂qˆ∗
∂pˆ∗
= k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 + k (k − 1) (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−2 pˆ∗ − k (k − 1)
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
− k (k − 1) (k − 2) pˆ∗
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−3 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
> k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 + k (k − 1) (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−2 pˆ∗ − k (k − 1) x¯n−k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 dε
− k (k − 1) (k − 2) pˆ∗x¯n−k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−3 dε
= k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−2 (x¯− p˜∗ + kpˆ∗) (1− x¯n−k) > 0.
Therefore, given that pˆ∗ < p˜∗, if we set pˆ∗ = p˜∗ then Y must be negative when x¯→ 1. That is, it
must be the case that
lim
x¯→1
Y |pˆ∗=p˜∗ = limx¯→1
[
1− p˜∗n − kp˜∗ + k (k − 1) p˜∗
∫ 1−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−2 dε− (n− k) p˜∗
]
= lim
x¯→1
[
1− p˜∗n − np˜∗ + k (k − 1) p˜
∗
n− 1
(
1− p˜∗n−1)] < 0. (71)
The FOC (69) may be rearranged as
1− x¯− p˜∗ + (n− k) (1− x¯)
1− x¯n−k
1
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (72)
The LHS of (72) increases in pˆ∗ because
k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k ∫ x¯−p˜∗0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε− k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 ∫ x¯−p˜∗0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)2k
=
k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗) ∫ x¯−p˜∗0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε− k ∫ x¯−p˜∗0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k+1
=
k
∫ x¯−p˜∗
0 (ε+ p˜
∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (x¯− p˜∗ − ε) dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k+1 > 0
Therefore, given that pˆ∗ < p˜∗, if we set pˆ∗ = p˜∗ then the LHS of (72) must be positive, that is,
1− x¯− p˜∗ + (n− k) (1− x¯)
1− x¯n−k
1
x¯k
1
n
(x¯n − p˜∗n) > 0 (73)
If we take the limit of the LHS of (73) when x¯→ 1, then we get the following inequality:
lim
x¯→1
[
−p˜∗ + 1
n
(1− p˜∗n)
]
> 0
This inequality implies that 1− p˜∗n − np˜∗ > 0 in the limit when x¯→ 1. As a result, (71) is positive.
But this constitutes a contradiction and therefore it cannot be the case that pˆ∗ > p˜∗ when x¯→ 1.
(c) Now we prove that pˆ∗ > p˜∗ if n = 3. We will use the results from the proof of part (b) of this
proposition. If n = 3,
Y (·)pˆ∗=p˜∗ = 1− p˜∗3 − 2x¯p˜∗ + p˜∗
(
x¯2 − p˜∗2)− x¯p˜∗ = 1− 2p˜∗3 + (x¯2 − 3x¯) p˜∗
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while condition (73) reduces to p˜∗ < 1− x¯+ 1
3x¯2
(
x¯3 − p˜∗3).
Then,
Y (·)pˆ∗=p˜∗ > 1− 2p˜∗3 +
(
x¯2 − 3x¯)(1− x¯+ x¯3 − p˜∗3
3x¯2
)
= 1 + p˜∗3
3− 7x¯
3x¯
− x¯
3
(3− x¯) (3− 2x¯)
> 1 +
(
1
2
)3 3− 7x¯
3x¯
− x¯
3
(3− x¯) (3− 2x¯) = 1
24x¯
(
3 + 17x¯− 72x¯2 + 72x¯3 − 16x¯4) (74)
which is always positive. Therefore, Ypˆ∗=p˜∗ > 0 and pˆ
∗ > p˜∗ if n = 3.
(d) Finally, in the limit when n→∞ the FOC of the merged entity becomes
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k − k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 pˆ∗ = 0 (75)
while that of a non-merging firm becomes
1
1− x¯ (x¯− pˆ
∗ + p˜∗)k (1− x¯− p˜∗) = 0.
This implies that limn→∞ p˜∗ = 1− x¯.
The LHS of (75) decreases in pˆ∗. Then, if pˆ∗ < p˜∗, the LHS of (75) must be negative if we replace
pˆ∗ by p˜∗ = 1− x¯. However,
1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 (1− x¯) = 1 + (k − 1) x¯k − kx¯k−1 ≥ 0
where the inequality follows from setting x¯ = 1. This establishes a contradiction so pˆ∗ < p˜∗ cannot
hold in the limit when n→∞. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Taking the FOCs, imposing the condition that and p˜ = p˜∗ and pˆ = pˆ∗
and simplifying gives:
1
n− k
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ (1− x¯− p˜
∗)+
1
n− k
[
x¯n−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k]+∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0
(76)(
x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (1− xk − kxk−1pˆ∗)+ k ∫ x−pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (77)
Assume that there is a pair of non-negative prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ that satisfy the system of equations (76)
and (77). For these prices to be consistent with equilibrium, first, they must be lower than or equal to
the monopoly prices pmk and p
m, respectively; moreover, the reservation utility at the merged entity
must be lower than the reservation utility at a non-merging firm.
Take the LHS of the FOC of a non-merging firm, equation (76). Note that the integral in this
equation is positive. Observe now that the second summand is also positive because the assumption
x¯ − p˜∗ > x − pˆ∗ implies that x¯ > x − pˆ∗ + p˜∗. As a consequence, if an equilibrium exists, the first
term of the FOC (76) must be negative. This implies that in equilibrium, it must be the case that
p˜∗ > 1− x¯.
Take now the limiting case where search cost is high so that x¯→ 1/2. If this is so, for an equilibrium
to exist, it must be the case that p˜∗ > 1/2. But this is a contradiction because p˜∗ ≤ pm = 1/2. 
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